

COMBAT FORCES

APRIL 1954

50¢

Terrain Tailors Tactics In
INDOCHINA



TESTAMENT OF FAITH



ROBERT T. STEVENS

Secretary of the Army

GREAT leadership is a priceless military asset, and the lack of it can never be offset by numbers of men, by a preponderance of guns and tanks, of planes, bombs, ships or any other material things, no matter how good they may be, how modern, how powerful. No matter how large and well-equipped it may be, a military force which goes forth to battle without fine leadership—not only at the top but all down through the ranks—marches toward defeat and disaster.

We certainly have fine leaders today. Never before have we had available so many senior officers tempered in the fires of war, thoroughly versed by experience in the command of large bodies of men, and practiced in the solution of military problems of the first magnitude.

WE are also fortunate in having the kind of enlisted men who make up the bulk of our Army. I have seen them under the stress of battle, I have seen them standing guard at far-flung outposts, and I have seen them undergoing their grueling training. I have talked to them and I have come to know them. And, knowing them, I am resolved that they shall continue to have the finest possible leadership—they deserve no less.

There are many examples I could mention [that would] serve to illustrate the kind of men of which this Army is composed. I reaffirm to all America today what a wonderful United States Army we have!

It is the responsibility of every American to “perpetuate a hard core of able, dedicated” soldiers

In the light of [the] record, and the outstanding character of our professional military men, it is deplorable that the Army as a whole—more particularly its Officer Corps, and especially its senior officers—should too often be the target for irresponsible criticism.

The fundamental principle emphasized by President Eisenhower that “. . . professional military leaders must not be thrust into the political arena to become the prey of partisan politics” has too often been forgotten or flouted. There is a tendency to overlook the fact that the soldier is an integral part of the community and is entitled to the same guarantees and protected by the same Bill of Rights as every other American citizen. It is sometimes forgotten that it was the Army which played a major role in the foundation of this Nation and made possible the firm establishment of liberty, justice, and individual freedom. The Army has successfully defended those principles in every war, and I propose to defend it and its prestige and integrity.

* * *

IF I had to find a single word by which to characterize the officers of the United States Army, that word would be: Integrity—absolute, uncompromising integrity.

This includes both professional integrity and moral integrity. By professional integrity I mean unceasing striving to master one of the most complex, difficult, and demanding vocations which exist. By moral integrity I mean loyalty to the American people, to the Government, to constituted civilian authority, and to the principles of truth, justice, and liberty upon which our government is based. I mean as true loyalty to subordinates as to superiors—loyalty up, and loyalty down.

* * *

I WANT to tell you something about the military mind. It is a mind which seeks to anticipate and prepare for every eventuality. It is a mind capable of dealing brilliantly with the special problems which concern the military security of the Nation. It is a mind conditioned by

courage, by a tradition of selfless service, by the highest standards of character. It is, in short, a mind which measures every action by the yardstick of “Duty—Honor—Country.” I fervently pray that our Nation will continue to develop such minds.

When I hear distinguished officers slurringly referred to as “the brass” it disturbs me greatly. I heartily endorse the sentiment of that eminent American and South Carolinian, Bernard Baruch, who said: “In my experience, ‘the brass’ is all pure gold.”


Men such as those who lead our Army today cannot and will not let America down in any respect—of that I am certain. The perpetuation of this hard core of able, dedicated officers and noncommissioned officers is of especially vital concern to the Nation as dangers and uncertainties beset us on every hand. The day that America allows this breed of men to die out through indifference, thoughtlessness, or neglect, that day America signs her own death warrant.

IT is of the utmost importance that everything possible be done to create an atmosphere conducive to the maintenance of a career military service, clothed in dignity and honor, which will be attractive to the highest type of young America. Nothing is more detrimental to the Service than a feeling among its personnel that they are held in low esteem by their fellow citizens. Any action which fosters such a conclusion strikes at the taproots of our security.

Unless the trend of recent years is reversed, and a climate created in which the development of military leadership of the highest type is encouraged, there will be little hope that in the future America will possess the kind of military leaders we are fortunate enough to have today and to have had in the past. The Secretary of Defense and the other officials of the Defense Department, as well as the members of Congress, are giving the matter very serious consideration at the present time. However, it is not their responsibility alone. It is the responsibility of every American



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
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
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BIGGER PUNCH—Two squads of hard-hitting Marines—26 men with full battle equipment—charge out of this new Sikorsky helicopter's wide-open nose door in a

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UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT FORCES *Journal*

Vol. 4, No. 9

April 1954

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Journal's Journal

WE don't have the space to offer a course in the economics of publishing, but take our word for it that the more members we have in the Association of the United States Army, the bigger—and better—your JOURNAL will be. It's a chicken-and-egg sort of proposition: better JOURNAL, more members; more members, better JOURNAL. We spend a lot of time and thought on both ends: getting more members, producing a better JOURNAL.

General Decker, our President, recently wrote all the general officers in the Army and asked what they thought of the JOURNAL. He passed the answers on to the staff. So the staff knows now, if it didn't before, that practically every general reads the JOURNAL, and most of them read it intelligently and critically.

We've been analyzing the comments and we're more puzzled than ever before. Many generals merely mention that the magazine is staying on its toes. Others have specific comments, but in large degree they cancel each other out. Who is right? The generals who say we need more platoon-level combat-action material, or those who insist that we need more high-level military and geopolitical thought? Those who believe we should leave the technical field to the magazines of the tech services, or those who think we should publish a much larger proportion of tech service material? Those who want us to punch hard on the loss of service benefits, or those who tell us to stick to our professional knitting? Those who want us to become a borderline lobbying organization, or those who want us to be staid and circumspect?

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is not published particularly for generals, although a larger proportion of the generals in the Army are members of the Association than the percentage in any other rank or grade. How do you company grade and field grade officers, and you enlisted members, feel about things?

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ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

U. S. Infantry Association, 1893-1950

U. S. Field Artillery Association, 1910-1950

PURPOSES

The Association of the United States Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to esprit de corps and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

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The Month's Mail

Thank You, Sir

To the Editors:

I have been informed that the *Infantry Journal*, which I read for many years, has been combined with *The Field Artillery Journal* and is now published as *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*.

This is welcome news, indeed, and consummates in part a hope of Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, when as Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, he placed the responsibility for the *Infantry*, *Field Artillery*, *Cavalry* and *Coast Artillery Journals* upon the Chief of the Requirements Section, Army Ground Forces.

I am very sorry to learn of the death of my good friend Colonel Joe Greene. Joe and I served together in Panama as second lieutenants, and for him I always had the highest regard and admiration. His going was a severe loss to the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*, but I take consolation in the fact that the staff, which Joe had had working for him and on which he had indelibly stamped his own personality, is carrying on with the Association and the *JOURNAL*.

So that I won't miss the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* in the future, please enter my membership in the Association of the United States Army. Enclosed is a check for twelve dollars.

With all best wishes, I am

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN

Deputy Commanding General

Headquarters, Sixth Army

Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

• The staff deeply appreciates this fine letter from a great soldier, who once was Chief of the Requirements Section, Army Ground Forces, and also served on the Executive Council of the Infantry Association.

Secretary Stevens

To the Editors:

In reference to "Meet the Army's Boss," in the March issue. Is he?

Perhaps the question should be directed at Pvt. David Schine, Colonel Francis Kreidel or Brigadier General Ralph Zwicker.

As for me, I wish I could feel more that he is the Army's boss and not that of some politicians pulling strings behind his back.

CAPT. ARTHUR L. LAUER
USAR

606 W. Bristol
Saginaw, Mich.

To the Editors:

Your article on Secretary Stevens was timely and informative. It was timely because it appeared at the high tide of the controversy over Mr. Stevens' defense of General Zwicker. It was informative because it gave us in the Army an insight into the character of the man toward whom we look for leadership.

All of the fine things you wrote or implied about Mr. Stevens were amply borne out by recent events. Mr. Stevens singularly displayed that golden trait of leadership: loyalty downward. And apparently he did it on his own; with guidance from no one save his own clear conscience.

The fact that later Mr. Stevens . . . concluded what he had a reasonable right to assume was a gentleman's agreement was widely construed at the time as a capitulation on the part of Mr. Stevens. Subsequent statements indicate that it was not a capitulation. And I believe that subsequent action on his part will bear this out.

A disquieting aftermath of all this is the persistent rumor, despite statements and releases to the contrary, that "Army Secretary Stevens may still be eased out of his job" (*Newsweek*, March 8, 1954). The argument is that Mr. Stevens' usefulness to the service was damaged beyond repair by his "surrender."

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

Quite the contrary. Far from his usefulness being damaged beyond repair, I am convinced that it has been repaired beyond damage! For it is not every day that men of Mr. Stevens' qualities can be found to take over the civilian leadership of the Army. The integrity and deep sense of "loyalty downward" which he possesses are not so plentiful in the marketplace that we can afford to trade them for a bit of superficial face-saving.

The Army's answer to our Secretary's unhesitating "loyalty downward" is, I am sure, unanimous "loyalty upward."

LT. COL., Infantry
Norfolk, Va.

Thanks

To the Editors:

I would like to say how much interest I always find in your JOURNAL. Lloyd Norman's article on "The New Look Strategy" is of particular interest.

With all good wishes.

B. H. LIDDELL HART

Wolverton Park
Buckinghamshire, Eng.

It's Your Association

To the Editors:

Where have I been all these years? Page 39 of the January issue of the JOURNAL had an article, "Personal Service," that indicated a member of the Association could ask for an examination of his 201 file by the Association. This was news to me!

I have wondered what the Association did for its members. Though I've been a reader for thirteen years—and voted for officers, and the merger—I never knew what the Association could accomplish for its members directly.

Perhaps there are many more readers who are well aware of the JOURNAL, but know little of the Association itself. How about an article explaining the mission and accomplishments of the Association of the United States Army?

The current series written by the staff of the Career Management Group is serving a good purpose.

MAJ. R. V. TAIBBI

Leominster, Mass.

Organic Tac Air

To the Editors:

I predict that some day the Army will regain its tactical air arm. I say this with one qualification, and that is it may be quite some time in the future. Eventually the Army is going to have its own tactical air arm because it is part of the infantry-armor-artillery team. In a wide open moving situation such as will occur in the event of another large scale war, it is a necessity that the Army have tactical air under its own control. I don't always agree with the Marines, but I will give them unqualified credit for their tactical air setup.

I can hear the airmen answering with their standard arguments about mass at the decisive point. That is a good point. Who

am I to disagree with one of the maxims of war? But let me define my terms. The Army's tactical air should be concerned only with close support missions. Interdiction and gaining air superiority is clearly a mission of the Air Force. They can do this with their planes that are designed to cope with enemy fighters and equipped to carry A-bombs and to perform the interdiction missions. But a plane and a pilot, the first designed and the second trained solely for close support of the ground forces is needed.

The Air Force pilot is of a different world than the ground soldier. He has never experienced ground training or ground combat. When he is called upon to make an air strike on such and such a hill he will do it to the best of his ability and knowledge. However, I believe that his knowledge is not great enough to do as good a job as his ability and his marvelous flying instrument of destruction will permit him to do. I mean this to reflect no discredit on our combat pilots in Korea.

The infantry division commander should have control of his own tactical air. He not only should have operational control, but the tactical air should be an organic part of his division. The planes should be piloted by men who have had basic training and a certain amount of service in a ground combat arm, and then sent on to flight training. The infantryman on the ground should be as accustomed to using an air strike as he is to using an artillery concentration.

America's strength lies in its technology. The mission of the American army is victory with the minimum number of casualties. Today with a cold war the new factor of economy has appeared. If one plane with some napalm can knock out a machine gun position holding up an attack rather than cost a platoon of infantry, the plane should be used. It will save lives and it is cheaper. I believe my concept of Army tactical air fits right in with the concept of smaller but more powerful forces laid down by President Eisenhower.

LT. HOWARD M. STEELE, JR.

APO 500, San Francisco, Calif.

Combat Films

To the Editors:

In addition to the courses prescribed in DATC No. 14, 1952, "Battle Indoctrination," there are other ways to prepare a prospective combat infantryman psychologically for combat. These are training films made up from actual combat scenes.

These films could be made by editing our large supply of combat films, and filming ("controlled" in contrast to "at random") actual battle sequences with a definite objective or purpose in mind.

These training films should be edited and planned as follows:

An Infantry School committee would determine what phases of combat are most needed to properly put across the picture in psychological indoctrination. Then another Infantry School committee would edit combat films already on hand. For future

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
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
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jobs the Signal Corps should inform the Infantry School as to the capabilities and limitations of combat photography.

Completed film would be supplemented by informal commentary. This commentary would state the similarity or dissimilarity between actual scenes and our doctrine.

The contents of such training films should follow generally and progressively what is covered in FM 7-10 through 7-40.

We know that technical difficulties would make it impossible generally, to film a unit even as small as a rifle squad through all phases of the attack on a limited objective. But this could be broken down, showing one unit crossing the LD, another moving into the assault position under supporting fires, still another in the actual combat assault.

As for the necessity of this project, can anyone deny that there is a gap between the indoctrination courses and actual combat?

I have mentioned only infantry. This is so because I believe that the amount of psychological necessary indoctrination and the transition gap to combat is greater in the infantry than in any other branch. However, they could be made for all arms.

CAPT. R. F. RUYFFELAERE

Office of the Army Advisor
State Armory
Holyoke, Mass.

On the Hill

To the Editors:

I picked your magazine up in the PX yesterday and was looking it over when I spied Lieutenant Martin's [sic, see editorial note below] article and I couldn't pass it by. I presume it was meant to be fiction; if not, it should have been. Lt. Martin may or may not be an excellent writer but, judging by his article, he's a lousy gunner. The first big flub to meet the eye was page 20, center column, 1st paragraph: "... six beautiful, deadly orange-red flowers bloom in the night like billowing puffs of fire. Air bursts, all. Deadly, murderous stuff." Anybody who would support a friendly patrol out in front of the MLR with air-bursting shells ought to have his head examined. Anybody that supported one of my patrols that way I'd cheerfully shoot without compunction, because that's practically premeditated homicide.

We now switch to page 21, center column, 5th paragraph: "This is Niner. Company-sized group in attack. Shoot Able George Fox Five, Four and Two. Battery Six. Over." Same column, next paragraph: "... and six orange-red puffs blossom ..." (this guy is in a descriptive rut). It seems to me a Battery Six would be six rounds per gun, a total of thirty-six, rather than just six rounds total. Unless, of course, by shoot a "Battery Six" he meant to shoot

the Battery Commander, and that would only be one round.

The closing paragraph is really what throws me, though, and I quote: "You have no answer. You only know that, given the chance, you'll go back up. On the Hill." This guy should have been a Marine. Also, he's different from every other FO from the 8th FA Bn that I've ever met; there was one with my platoon up on Outpost Duck with us for three weeks, and his words as we came off the hill were: "If I never see that G- D- F- hill again it will still be too soon." I agree with him. If it was my job to take my platoon up on an outpost I'd do it without a word, but I'll be hung and drawn and quartered if I'd volunteer my services and those of my men to go live in a cave like a mole; I'm a man but not a troglodyte!

SGT. DON MCGREEVEY

27th Infantry NCO School
APO 25, San Francisco, Calif.

● The "orange-red puffs" evidently temporarily blinded Sgt. McGreevey as there is no Lt. Martin in the article at all. The authors were Lt. Jim Kyle and Cpl. Richard Smith. Sgt. McGreevey is right; the order does call for 36 rounds and not six.

✓ ✓ ✓

To the Editors:

Being an artilleryman, "On the Hill" in the January issue deeply moved me.

However, I could not help noticing a mistake in radio procedure. The OP was given "On the way, over" and replied, "On the way, wait," which would mean that the OP will make the next transmission. However, the policy of most battalions in Korea was to give a "Splash" which they did. Therefore in this case the OP should have answered "On the way, over."

Another error that could have been quite serious on the Corporal's part was using his aid dressing rather than the injured man's.

I enjoyed the article very much and would like to see more like it.

PHILIP L. BARD

Brooklyn, Conn.

Tired, but Unbowed Guardsman

To the Editors:

Thanks for your Staff Report: "New Look for Reserves" in the March issue. Especially for voicing that plaintive query which as a National Guard company commander, I'd like to echo: "Where are the men?"

When I think of starting a new unit without a cadre sent down by S-3 . . . visiting gas stations and garages looking for a motor sergeant and mechanics . . . hounding restaurants for cooks . . . preaching to high school assemblies for soldiers . . . keeping that strength above minimum maintenance standards set by D/A . . . cleaning and maintaining equipment with a handful of people . . . when I think of these and similar problems caused by lack

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


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of manpower in the reserves, I don't mind confessing that I envy my brothers-in-arms of the regular establishment.

I'm inclined to think that too few people realize the extent to which, as you so aptly phrased it, "... military talents of officers and men ... have been dissipated in the discouraging effort of recruiting personnel for their units."

The Engineer company which I command was organized exactly two years—96 drills—ago. In that short time we have recruited one hundred enlisted men and four officers—an average of one per week. For part time salesmen, that is not a bad average. It takes a lot of time.

The discouragement enters, however, when we find that our present strength is forty men and four officers. We've lost over half the men we recruited.

While this may not be significant, it is interesting to note that twenty-one of our losses have been to the active services. While 21 percent of the men we recruited—at what price!—are now on active duty, we have never gotten a man in the outfit who, on returning from active service, faces a period of so-called obligatory service.

I'm not bitter ... just tired.

CAPT. JOHN H. BOLTON
CENGUS

Silver Spring, Md.

Too Much Artillery Fire?

To the Editors:

Maj. Mason J. Young's article in the November Cerebrations revives the question of whether the increased rate of artillery fire in Korea was excessive. My Korean tour, including duty at the FDCs of two different divisions and one corps, convinced me that the rate of fire was not only excessive but potentially dangerous.

Maj. Young defends the rate with his example of Company B which was saved by the expenditure of 2,200 rounds. I wonder if that amount was necessary or was it fired merely because it was available. How long can that rate be maintained if the rest of the regiment is attacked? If the infantry depends upon this high rate, what happens if it cannot be maintained?

There is an even more serious question. Were the thousands of young soldiers trained in the stalemated period of Korea given a true picture of combat?

CAPT. EDWARD R. GUHL

Fort Riley, Kansas

Gripe

To the Editors:

For the past several months we have heard about a hundred different ways to make the Army more attractive and thereby inducing the men who really are the backbone of the Army to remain in service. These include medical care for dependents of those not residing on an Army post (a present impossibility), new uniforms, specialist ratings (the biggest boner of all), and prestige (now non-existent) for non-

coms. All that has been accomplished though is to make the career soldier feel more insecure than ever.


At the present time there is speculation regarding reduction, retesting, discharging men whose AGCT scores fall below a certain percentage. The old-timers (SFC, MSgt and others with 10 or more years) feel that this is the straw that broke the camel's back and are getting out of the Army to stay. Most of these men have performed their duties satisfactorily for the past several years and a great number of them did so before such things as AGCTs and MOSs were ever heard of. Now they suddenly find that if they cannot put a bunch of scrambled cardboard together and read about 1000 words a minute, they are regarded as unfit for service or the grade they hold. Committees can burn midnight oil [but] I have yet to see anyone who actually contacts the everyday GI to ask him what should be done to better the Army.

I have been around this Army quite

some time and have seen the Good Army, the Pretty Good Army, the Indifferent Army, the Civilian Army and the present Army. Give us back the Buck Sergeant, the Lieutenant who merited respect from his subordinates by just being a "soldier" and you'll have the morale problem half solved. Favoritism, cliques—all contribute to the present state of the Army. ... *Esprit de corps* will be automatic when harassment quits. Inefficiency certainly is not automatic and a distinction shared by the enlisted man alone—it comes from those whose actions are derogatory to the service, whatever their rank. I respect the officer and NCO who shows that he respects the uniform he wears and himself. I am certain other soldiers do too. The Army is what we make it and it is up to us to make this a good Army. It is our career. The examples set by those in authority are the ones the will be followed.

GEORGE M. CHANCELLOR

AP0 39, New York, N. Y.



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Front And Center

Swedish View of Warfare in 1960

"Grey-Green" Uniform Coming

The Chief of Staff Testifies on the Army Budget

Sweden's Defense staff has prepared a 100-page booklet on what war will be like in 1960. The JOURNAL has not yet been able to get a translation, but those familiar with it say the Swedes think that warfare in 1960 and after will be a war directed and controlled by electronics. In addition to nuclear weapons in quantity, they expect that improved Napalm, nerve gases and contagious viruses may be used. Electronic instruments will be used to control most weapons and this includes the use of television to spot targets and assess results of attacks.

The British have also taken a look at war of the future and the Minister of Defense has reported that "it must be assumed that atomic weapons would be employed by both sides." Following a period of "intense atomic attacks lasting a relatively short time" both sides would be forced "to seek to recover their strength, carrying on the struggle in the meantime as best they might." To the Defense Minister this emphasizes the "prime necessity of basing our defense policy upon the prevention of war. It also makes clear the need to keep the lead which we now hold in technical development on which we must rely to offset the preponderance of the Communist States in manpower. Our active forces must be able to withstand the initial shock. Our reserve forces must be capable of rapid mobilization behind the shield which our active forces provide and be ready to perform their combat tasks at the earliest possible moment."

In his formal statement on the Army's 1955 budget to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, General Ridgway touched briefly on the manifold tasks of the Army and its many commitments.

On manpower he noted that we will enter the fiscal year with a strength of 1,407,200 and finish with 1,172,700. This will be a quarter of a million fewer men than the Army had in fiscal 1954. This reduction, General Ridgway said, "has made it necessary for the Army to reevaluate its military programs, its pres-

ent force structure, and its world-wide deployments in order to provide the greatest possible number of appropriately supported combat forces within the reduced ceiling of 1,172,700." He noted that the Army would have 19 divisions in fiscal 1955 and drop to 17 in the following year. In addition it has 18 regiments and regimental combat teams, 122 antiaircraft battalions, and 148 other combat battalions—"engineer, armor, field artillery, guided missile and rocket."

General Ridgway said that 315,000 men will be unavailable to the Army for combat or combat support units. These will be in training, in transient or patient status, or assigned to such tasks as "international headquarters, joint activities, reserve component instructors" and the like. Of the remaining 857,692, 669,516 (78.1%) will be assigned to "combat field army forces" and 188,176 (21.9%) to "support forces world-wide."

General Ridgway said that approximately one-third of the strength of the Army during the year will be "untrained input," that is recruits. He estimated that "replacements for losses through the year will be approximately 463,000" although the Army will lose about 707,000 men during the year.

General Ridgway said that during the year "it is planned to emphasize particularly the play of atomic and other special weapons to develop and test new doctrine pertaining to their utilization and role in modern warfare."

If the Congress agrees, you can be pretty sure that the Army will be in its new uniform—the "3d Infantry grey-green" job—within a year or so. The basic uniform will be the winter service uniform. It will be for general duty off-duty wear. Blue dress uniforms will be optional. The present "combat uniform" will be retained as the drill and training

uniform and local commanders will be authorized to determine when it will be worn. The big problem will be to convince Congress that now is the time to make the change and that it can be made economically.

The elimination of the unit administrator and the return of his responsibilities to the first sergeant is one step in the Army's program of revitalizing the non-commissioned officer corps. Another will be the establishment of specialists, thus separating noncommissioned leaders from those who are without direct leadership responsibility. Noncoms can also hope that there will be a restoration of the prerogatives and privileges that make these leaders respected and envied by all ranks.

There's a pronounced "airborne look" in the higher echelons of the Department of the Army. The Chief of Staff has been the Army's senior paratrooper for many years. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, is a paratrooper, and, as everyone knows, so is Major General James Gavin, the new Assistant Chief of Staff, G3. Also Lieutenant General W. B. Palmer, Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, once commanded the 82d Airborne Division. Some observers also suggest that another favorable omen to airborne operations is the announcement by the Air Force that General O. P. Weyand is to command the Tactical Air Force. General Weyand was commander of the Far East Air Force during most of the Korean conflict and he also was General George S. Patton's favorite air officer during the campaigns of the Third Army in Europe.

In his statement on Army research and development General Ridgway included a twenty-three word sentence that is no less than intriguing. It is: "Among important requirements in the field of land combat is the development of sufficient tank and antitank capability to overcome known enemy potential."



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
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
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For the nation's security we must close ranks and present a united front, proudly proclaiming the

Battle Future of Our Army

COLONEL UNITAS

If each of us did not have a deep-seated personal belief that the Army must have a prominent role in the cold war and will be a decisive factor in any future hot war, our pride in the uniform we wear would be a mockery and our usefulness as soldiers would be destroyed. Yet, almost without our realizing it, the Army is engaged in a struggle for survival as a major combat service. Some would make the Army a police force, useful only in cold war situations, to prevent conquest by political subversion and seduction, or to fight a "local" defensive type of war on the order of the Korean conflict. Such a role would eventually reduce the Army to impotency.

Thus, to escape limbo, the Army must not be content with a defensive mission, but must maintain its position as a powerful offensive arm, vitally needed in any war of the future. Maintaining such a position will become

increasingly more difficult and complex as new developments bring about an increasing overlap between traditional service functions.

Since unification, inter-service competition within the Department of Defense has been keen. It seems to me that the Army has been at a serious disadvantage for several reasons. First of all, our Army leaders, with perhaps more "joint" experience in high command positions than leaders in other services, have been fair-minded to the point where they are reluctant to support their own service. The inevitable result has been a gradual diminution of Army prestige.

Secondly, the Army has had to shoulder heavy postwar tasks such as the occupation of Germany and Japan, burdens with which the other services are not encumbered. Consequently, the Army has not been in a good position to react promptly to the impact of rapidly changing conditions of warfare.

Other factors that hurt the Army are of its own mak-

COLONEL UNITAS, Infantry, now on duty in Europe, is a professional soldier with eighteen years of service.

The combat arms must be emphasized; we cannot prevail without top-notch infantry

ing. We do not, for example, always present a united front, as the Army is far from being unified itself; with three major combat arms, seven technical services, and six administrative services, not to mention various other categories. Is it any wonder that we sometimes seem to be our own worst enemies? Until we get our house in order and get some semblance of unification within the Army structure, we shall continue to be at a disadvantage.

The Army has become the largest logistician of the armed services and this has tended to overemphasize our supply role at the expense of our combat role. Moreover, the support rendered the other services by the Army is not generally understood, nor is the Army fully credited for it. On the contrary, the Air Force and the Marine Corps, in particular, claim special praise as the most efficient users of manpower, while the Army for its reward is publicly accused of wasting manpower.

WHAT is the battle future of our Army? Present concepts of future warfare express two extremes. One is the so-called "push-button" concept wherein the war will be won or lost by inter-continental battles with guided missiles carrying atomic warheads. This concept would appear to rule out large conflicts between men on the ground or in the air, and offers "something for nothing"; that is, we devastate the enemy's homeland and decimate his people, without any casualties of our own.

The other extreme is that atomic weapons are simply larger packages of fire power and do not alter the fact that wars are won on the ground; all weapons existing only to help the ground soldier to advance.

Regardless of what our own personal convictions may be, the United States cannot afford to indulge in either extreme, but must seek a moderate course that seems to hold the brightest promise of victory.

THE strategic position of the United States today can only be maintained if it is able to intervene rapidly and decisively in any part of the world. To preserve this capability of decisive intervention we must secure our continental base, secure essential forward bases, and be able to deploy offensive forces rapidly to decisive areas. No single service can claim any of these as its sole or primary province; rather, these basic undertakings require the coordinated and complementary efforts of land, sea, and air power.

This strategic concept exerts a profound effect on the military posture of the United States. The Army, for example, must forever abandon its traditional scheme of mobilization, building up gradually in an emergency from a peacetime skeleton structure. Rather the Army henceforth must have combat-ready formations in being—divisions, corps, and field armies. Such forces will be needed regardless of cold war requirements, in terms of

overseas troop deployments. Only when we have such formations can we be assured that the United States will have the offensive power to intervene in critical areas in time to be decisive. Moreover, the presence of such substantial forces in being may mean, besides the difference between winning and losing the war, great savings in the ultimate requirements in men, matériel, and time needed to defeat the enemy.

Some Americans say that the United States cannot afford to be prepared to fight any kind of war. They say that we should prepare only for a global atomic war of military aggression. This school may be ascendant. It proposes the idea of security through air power and opposes the concept of so-called "balanced forces." On the other hand, common prudence and good judgment would seem to dictate that the United States can't afford *not* to be ready for any type of warfare. The U.S. cannot gamble its survival on one theory alone.

REGARDLESS of what thesis we accept, and whether or not nuclear weapons are employed, the role of the Army still remains basically the same—to assist in seizing and securing bases from which to launch the final attack that will defeat the enemy's forces and occupy his heartland. Even under the extreme assumption that the enemy is rendered completely helpless by long-range atomic assault, armies, capable of offensive action, must physically occupy critical territory to prevent the resumption of hostilities, and to avoid creating the vacuum of power that will inevitably cause later conflicts. Thus it seems clear that initial minimum Army force requirements will remain fairly constant, whereas long-range Army requirements will depend largely on the conditions under which the war is fought and the general course it takes.

If the security of our country requires substantial Army forces, we must see to it that this inescapable truth is realized. We must work to make the nation aware that its Army has a major offensive role within the U.S. defense structure and that the Army is ready to carry out its assigned functions. To achieve this, the Army must pull together as a unit. There is nothing wrong with our men, our officers, our units, or with our schools and training establishment. They are fine. What is lacking is a common goal and a common program resolutely laid down from topside.

I outline such a program below. It is broken down into two general areas: policy and organization.

POLICY-WISE we should adopt a program along these lines: Establish a Department of the Army "party line," published widely throughout the Army and periodically revised in the light of current concepts and developments. This will guide the Army as a whole. This top-



The Army must adjust its thinking and doctrines to the realities of nuclear weapons

side policy guidance should indicate the Army position on all important matters, particularly controversial subjects which have a long-term impact on the future of the Army. All subordinate Army leaders and agencies could then follow and support current policy. Thus senior Army leaders would no longer announce dissimilar opinions on the effectiveness of the current Army-Air Force air-ground operations system, *vis-à-vis* a unanimity of Air Force opinion on this subject.

We must constantly emphasize the combat role of the Army. Positive action must be taken to insure that the administrative and technical services are kept in the proper perspective, existing solely to support the combat arms. It follows that the prestige of the combat arms must be raised. The combat arms must get the highest type of officers and men, and within the combat arms, the infantry must have first preference. The best ordnance and quartermaster troops in the world, and the finest artillery and armor, are of no avail, if our infantry is not top-notch.

We must oppose "dog-robbing" for the Air Force and Marine Corps, and insist that they assume responsibility for their own support wherever possible. If the present trend isn't reversed, the Army may gradually assume as its primary role, the common logistic support of the other services.

We must stress the Army's present position as the actual physical first line of defense—with combat troops deployed in close proximity to the Iron Curtain in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Korea. Likewise, we must emphasize the combat readiness of Army units to meet any kind of emergency. We must not let the Marines establish any monopoly as a ready ground force. Our entire thinking must be geared to the recognition that the Army must be able to provide effective combat forces on D-day, not on D plus 540 or 720. Thus, Army mobilization plans must take first things first, ruthlessly eliminating all "nice-to-know" subjects, and cutting overall training times to the bone. Under this concept of a substantial ready D-day force, with a rapid build-up to post-D-day force requirements, our Army Reserve and National Guard components need a complete overhauling.

On the organizational side, I think we should reorganize the Department of the Army so as to accomplish the following:

- ¶ Recognize the combat arms as such, by designating a Chief of Combat Arms, with infantry, armor, and artillery deputies, and assigning him primarily personnel functions, but placing him in a position to influence branch school, training, organizational, and development matters.
- ¶ Eliminate Army Field Forces, establishing instead nec-

essary operating commands, on a functional basis, such as a Replacement and School Command, and a Development and Experimental Unit Command, reporting directly to the Department of the Army.

¶ Eliminate the technical and administrative service chiefs, as such, and organize necessary operating agencies on a functional basis, such as procurement, construction, and so on, under one Supply Corps Chief and one Administrative Corps Chief, as appropriate. Present branch designations, units, and schools should be retained, but integrated into the new structure. Branches would be recognized personnel-wise by having branch personnel deputies under the Supply Corps Chief and Administrative Corps Chief.

FINALLY, in the organization of our units, take a bold new approach in regard to our present combat formations, with the following objectives in mind:

¶ Increase combat effectiveness with proportionately less overhead, for example, along the lines of a square division and square regiment as suggested by General Lynch in "The Infantry Division: Triangular or Square?", in the November 1953 issue of this magazine.

¶ Reduce the number of different types of weapons, vehicles, and other equipment. We must overcome the tendency to keep adding new arms without giving up old ones. In particular, we must recognize the impact on our combat support and service support structure of guided missiles.

¶ Recognition of the need in an atomic war for highly self-sufficient units with great staying and recuperative power, and considerable mobility, that can continue to fight even when isolated and deprived of normal combat and service support. This applies equally to infantry, armor, or airborne formations.

¶ Put flexibility in our organizations so that major formations can readily provide smaller, compact, hard-hitting task force type units, airborne or air-transportable, for decisive exploitation where and when opportunity presents itself.



IN summary, the Army must retain an offensive mission and capability in this atomic age. Moreover, the Army must face up to the realities of nuclear weapons—it is inadequate to say that atomic weapons have not basically changed our doctrine, but have only affected the application of that doctrine, that is, our tactics and technique. Perhaps this conclusion sufficed when only the "nominal" and larger atomic bombs were taken into consideration, but with the advent of the H-bomb, on the order of megatons of explosive power, we must try to grasp its potentialities and re-charge our thinking. To do otherwise would amount to nothing else than suicidal neglect of our Army's responsibilities to the country we serve.

LOYALTY DOWNWARD

A man has honor if he holds himself to a course of conduct because of a conviction that it is in the general interest, even though he is well aware that it may lead to inconvenience, personal loss, humiliation or grave physical risk.—THE ARMED FORCES OFFICER

IN the last week of February Robert T. Stevens met the sternest test of his stewardship of the high office of Secretary of the Army. His performance was in the finest traditions of the military service.

His duty as he saw it was to protect the integrity of the United States Army in the general interest and for the greater good of the people of the United States. He had no other purpose. His weapons were idealism, a high code of personal conduct, courage and truth. If he made a tactical error it was from political inexperience, is personally creditable to him and of no lasting consequence. What is of consequence is that his pursuit of his objective was ultimately successful. Only time can reveal the full measure of the success. But certainly developments will show that more was gained than lost.

The COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is immensely proud that the March issue of the magazine, containing the story of Secretary Stevens, appeared during the week of his hard ordeal. If the staff could have anticipated the events that were to occur, it would have been even more emphatic (it could have been) in showing that Mr. Stevens is a man who has the best interests of the Army and the men and women who wear the Army uniform close to his heart. That we were not was due only to a small doubt as to the propriety of a professional military magazine giving even the appearance of blowing any individual's horn too loudly. (As a prideful aside, the staff can add that the article makes clear to the reader why Mr. Stevens acted and spoke as he did during that week.)

It is a measure of Mr. Stevens' sincerity that immediately after he had seen the newspaper accounts of General Zwicker's humiliating experience he called the General on the telephone and told him that if the facts were as represented in the press, "you have my full backing. Don't worry about this affair."

Then he publicly announced that he had directed General Zwicker not to appear on the following Tuesday before the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. "I am unwilling for so fine an officer . . . to run the risk of further abuse," Mr. Stevens announced. General Zwicker "suffered humiliating treatment only because he carried out actions which were his official duty and executed an order he had received from higher headquarters which he was required to execute. I cannot permit the loyal officers of our Armed Forces to be subjected to such unwarranted treatment."

There are a few vital facts here that must be kept clearly in mind.


¶ Secretary Stevens was not trying to "cover up" for General Zwicker or any other person in the Army. There was nothing to cover up. He had already acknowledged that administrative methods had been faulty in the case of Dr. Peress. But under the law they could hardly have been otherwise.

¶ Secretary Stevens and the Army do not "coddle" Communists. At Mr. Stevens' direction the Army had cooperated in every possible with the Investigations subcommittee.

¶ Mr. Stevens did not say (and has never said) that Army officers are sacrosanct and beyond fair criticism. He did say: "The prestige and morale of our Armed Forces are too important to the security of the Nation to have them weakened by unfair attacks on our officer corps . . . I am confident the American people do not believe in unwarranted abuse of our loyal officers any more than I do."

¶ Finally, he did not enunciate a policy of forbidding officers to testify before the subcommittee. He directed that General Zwicker and two other officers who had been summoned should not appear at a particular hearing. Three officers only were involved, and one occasion. He then offered to appear himself—in keeping, it must be added, with his expressed opinion that the Secretary of the Army is the responsible head of the Army; the Army's "boss."

A man of honor, he held himself to a course of conduct from the conviction that it was in the general interest. The cost to him personally was great, far greater than most of us can conceive. But whatever the cost, he did not count it, but bravely and forthrightly pressed forward in his sworn duty of defending the best interests of the United States and promoting its military security.



BRIG. GEN. RALPH ZWICKER

... all of us know that our military services and their leaders have always been completely loyal and dedicated public servants. . . . Their courage and their devotion have been proved in peace as well as on the battlefields of war. . . . In this tribute . . . I mean to include General Zwicker, who was decorated for gallantry in the field.
President Eisenhower

**THE CHIEF OF STAFF GREET'S
SECRETARY STEVENS**

"In the course of my entire service I have met no government official who combines within his person a greater degree of integrity, personal courage, and sense of duty toward the Army, whose interests he has wholly at heart."

General Ridgway



THERE remains the task of assessing the effects of the controversy on the Army. This is no simple balancing of accounts. Much remains hidden in the unplumbed depths of the minds of men, but it may be profitable to consider some of the surface manifestations.

It is said by some that the whole controversy was an unfortunate episode that was overemphasized as a vital blow at Army morale. Army officers, according to this theory, are overly sensitive; they should learn to be as thick-skinned as men who love the rough-and-tumble of political debate. This argument overlooks the fact that Army officers by law and custom do not engage in political debate and therefore any political attack on them is a one-sided affair.

Finally it is argued that the Army has survived harder blows at its morale and prestige than this one, so why fret about it.

This much can be said for this theory: the Army will survive. Indeed, morale should be higher when soldiers understand the full implications of Mr. Stevens' forthrightness and President Eisenhower's personal defense of General Zwicker. The abuse General Zwicker suffered will not be forgotten. The wound it made will heal if left undisturbed, but it will certainly fester and grow if attacks on the uniform persist. Such attacks are cumulative and in time they can destroy an army.

Overemphasis or not, emotions had become so highly charged that the true issue—the integrity of the Army—was being lost. At the height of the controversy General Ridgway found it necessary to counsel with his senior officers and to explain to them what had actually occurred. It is possible that this was a unique instance in

the history of the United States Army. At what other time has the senior officer of the Army found it advisable to counsel with his senior assistants on such a matter as this?

During that conference General Ridgway paid a personal tribute to Secretary Stevens. "In the course of my entire service," he said, "I have met no government official who combines within his person a greater degree of integrity, personal courage, and sense of duty toward the Army, whose interests he has wholly at heart."

THERE is a lesson here for the American citizen who does not wear a military uniform. It is that soldiers are honorable servants of the nation and not serfs. It is that he who scoffs, degrades and insults men wearing the uniform, is indulging in a fantastically dangerous pastime that if persisted in could destroy the very well-springs of the military forces, leaving the nation deceptively defenseless. The appearance of a fighting force might remain, but the soul would be withered away. And an army without a soul is but an empty husk.

In summary, let it be noted by all that Secretary Stevens not only defended the Army well and proved that loyalty does go down as well as up, but that he also reaffirmed the principle that the civilian head of the Army is the proper avenue of approach to the Army by other departments and branches of the government.

Those hypocritical observers who are disappointed do not understand Mr. Stevens' mission. His object was not to interfere with legislative processes—his mission was to preserve the integrity of the Army and its personnel, and in that he succeeded.

Fort Belvoir Papers Please Copy

PUBLISHING a retraction is sometimes a bitter experience, but here is one we publish happily. We made a statement in our March issue that probably would stand up in court because it is factually true, but the implications were all wrong.

We wrote that we had never seen anything in the Washington newspapers about the planetarium at Fort Belvoir. We hadn't. But thousands of others had, and some of them wasted no time in telling us so.

We have since learned that newspapers in Washington, Alexandria and Fairfax County have carried stories and pictures on the planetarium, and that there was even a 15-minute television show on the subject. Our happy apologies to the Post Commander, the PIO, and others at Belvoir. They are "happy" because our one reason for the original comment was to help the Army—and we learn that Fort Belvoir was 'way ahead of us with this particular idea.

We might add, too, that the school kids who have told us about the planetarium are enthusiastic about it and Fort Belvoir.

If We Are to Have Less We Must Have Better

TWENTY divisions this year; seventeen next year; maybe only fourteen by 1956. Unless Congress decides otherwise, the Army is to decline in strength. To the soldier this is a grim picture. It portends a reduction in military strength that the facts hardly justify. The soldier has not forgotten—he cannot forget—the cost to the nation of those manpower-starved two-battalion regiments of 1950...

But in soldier fashion the Army will make the best of what is given it. This leads every thinking soldier to an inevitable conclusion: if the Army is to perform its missions with fewer soldiers, it must have *better* soldiers, manning *better* weapons and equipment.

Army technical services and Army research and development agencies are working night and day to produce the better weapons and improved equipment the Army must have.

Better weapons and equipment aren't enough. The Army must also have *better* men; men who can learn the skills that are needed to operate the new weapons and equipment. And since these skills are highly technical, Army training must be better. This means longer periods of training. In some cases it takes a full enlistment for a soldier to become completely skilled in a vital technical job. So it is imperative that these better men, who are better trained, should serve longer.

The Army must also have better leaders, better noncommissioned officers. Good noncoms are developed through service, so those the Army must have can only be produced through long and hard training. One hitch is not enough. It is in the second enlistment that a noncom acquires the experience and confidence that make him a reliable leader with a high standard of performance. And it is in his later hitches that the Army gets lucrative dividends from the investment it began when it tapped him as a potential leader.

So the Army must have better men, better trained, who serve longer.

HOW can we induce them to serve longer? Not long ago Senator Saltonstall expressed surprise when he was told that while the Army can offer a master sergeant about \$350 to re-enlist, he can get up to \$5,000 from the government by leaving the service. That is because of veterans' benefits in education, housing subsidy and other assistance. The Army doesn't ask that veterans' benefits be reduced just to encourage re-enlistments. Not at all. It just asks that a little attention be given to increasing inducements and rewards for military skill and service. This includes improved living conditions, medical care for dependents, a more stable family life. If the Army could make these simple American desires more widely available to soldiers, the reservoirs of competent leadership and skilled technicians could be re-filled to the ultimate advantage of the nation.

If the Army is to have less, it must have better. To get better men and to keep the best, the Army life must be made more attractive.

It is time to take a long, hard look at the re-enlistment inducements the Army can offer. That look should include the dollars-and-cents waste in training men only to lose them. It also includes such tangible desires as adequate pay, attractive uniforms, good housing conditions, and stable family life.

That look must be taken so that the nation can have the greater—and needed—security of a finer, stronger Army.



STARS



STRIPES

and



A-BOMBS

COLONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT

THE summer sun had almost reached the horizon when lines of battle broke from the forest just where expected, but by God they were not Marshal Grouchy's expected reinforcements, but Blücher's Prussians! No art of generalship could now stave off disaster. Head sunk listlessly upon his chest, Napoleon rode from the plains of Waterloo en route to exile and slow death. Behind him on the field he had deserted, still fighting, sergeants held the Old Guard to its work—finding a quicker death by spurning quarter with the four letter words sergeants have always used in all armies;

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words that somehow became "The Guard dies but *never* surrenders."

* * *

SOME 300 miles away and 130 years later, another general watched for the air strike that would precede his assault on another obscure rural village. The ominous distant buzz swelled into the roar of hundreds of low-flying heavy bombing planes. Earth tremors back at the command post assured him that tons of explosive were crashing down along the Perriers road according to plan.

Yet not exactly according to plan. Reports from the 9th and 4th Divisions were bad. Bombs had struck among them. There were hundreds of casualties and the assault was delayed for reorganization. For the moment there was nothing General Lightning Joe Collins could do except wait.

Where the bombs had dropped, sergeants were rallying shaken remnants of squads; forming platoons that gave life to attacking companies and battalions. Those sergeants did their work well. The General's plan suffered an amazingly short delay; minutes in some places; two hours in others that were harder hit. St. Lô fell before night. The decisive breakout had begun.

* * *

IN ancient days the ordeals in combat of generals and sergeants were similar, however different their lives elsewhere. Weapons were short-ranged; numbers engaged were small. However brilliant the general's plan, it was his good right arm that hewed out victory on the field. Henry of Navarre's white plume, Richard the Lionhearted's axe, were more than symbols. In those days armies literally obeyed the leader's "Follow Me." If the leader fell, the heart usually went out of the entire host.

But civilization's "progress" brought weapons that killed at constantly increasing range. Dispersion, no novelty in war's art, diminished the power of personal leadership. The gulf between general and sergeant widened. Wearers of stars became more and more their army's brain, less and less its strong right arm. The men with stripes on their sleeves remained "the backbone of an army" but added a new function: the delicate nerve system that responded to the brain . . . or, failing, caused paralysis and defeat.

ONLY yesterday the first telltale mushroom cloud rose swiftly into the sky over Hiroshima. One bomb destroyed a city. Now, little more than eight years later, the world is entering an era of atomic plenty.

What impact the first appearance of gunpowder on the battlefield had on generals and sergeants has never been explored. We can leave that intriguing research to antiquarians. What we want to know now is how atomic weapons will affect generals, noncoms and all other ranks.

Question number one—the role of generalship in tactical atomic warfare has received some attention. We dimly accept, without grasping the details, that the man who can loose such mighty explosions has been vouchsafed a tremendous power personally to influence the issue of every battle. The atom's impact upon generalship restores the personal capacity to influence combat action. Tomorrow's commanders, whether from command post map or command plane radarscope, will be able to order "three 20KTs here, four 40s there, and one 80 on that spot." Victory or defeat, life or death for thousands, will lie in the accuracy and timeliness of the commander's directive.

BUT what of the sergeants in atomic combat? Have superweapons changed their fundamental roles on the battlefield? Doubtless dozens of new MOS numbers in logistics, communications, intelligence and weapons handling will spread like a contagion. But tanker, gunner, doughboy, engineer and medic will still need their noncoms for the dirty vital tasks. An army's intricate, interlocking nervous system must continue to translate the brain's orders into muscular energy.

There will be no atomic-powered picks and shovels for digging the deeper and even more frequent foxholes into which each man must burrow or die. Atomic-powered ships, perhaps aircraft, may speed mountains of supplies over oceans (if they can find undestroyed ports and landing strips at which to load and unload) but the last long mile(s) into combat for front-line munitions and supplies will still be covered by foot and back power.

Small groups of technicians may handle atomic weapons, but hundreds and thousands of soldiers—under the watchful eyes of sergeants—will labor to restore essential routes and services battered by the missiles. Damage control was long a Navy term limited to shipboard connotation. Now redesignated "area damage control," it promises to emerge into the most exacting single job of combat support.

How will shaken and scattered survivors rally from the terrific blast and shock to remember their mission, often

without officer leadership; reform to occupy blocking positions, restore silenced weapons to action, maneuver, or advance in spite of losses—in all these and other unforeseeable emergencies, the muscles of an army will function or go flabby in direct proportion to the quality of the noncommissioned officers who enforce the brain's commands.

Atomic warfare's front-line fighter probably will note less alterations in his profession than will the combat support soldiers in the communications zone. Up front, as Mauldin called it, the soldier will become accustomed to greater loneliness. He will dig oftener and deeper for himself and his equipment. He will pay greater attention to avoiding those telltale indications that spot his position for the enemy. He will be chary of wasting ammunition, or any other commodity, for many reasons, principally because they will all be harder to come by. In a word, the combat soldier will experience a rougher, dirtier war. Individuals and very-small-unit resourcefulness and discipline cannot ensure survival but their lack will spell suicide.

But port companies, petroleum battalions and the like will have more in common with tomorrow's combat soldier than ever before. Combat units offer atomic targets when not in close contact with enemy forces (who would be decimated by the same blast), when concentrated in response to tactical imperatives, or when occupying key positions which, either geographically, tactically or from both aspects, unduly interfere with the enemy's chosen plan of operations. True enough, the sergeant and his men will seldom know when those risky conditions prevail. The tension will be endless; the penalties for carelessness fatal. But after all, that has been the combat man's precarious existence throughout warfare. The atom is quicker, more deadly, but the death it brings is no stranger to front-line soldiers.

WHAT were once safe spots in Communications Zone will now be subject to atomic attack. Units serving such installations will never be immune. Consequently it is rearward that the greatest strain will be felt. Every key locality from port (or beachhead) to forward depot will attract atomic missiles in proportion to its value to the tactical situation. Just as "dispersion" sufficient to discourage all atomic attack is impossible when tactical units are deployed for effective attack or defense, so no communications zone facilities and establishments can be split into sufficiently small bits to be immune. If they were, they

could serve no purpose beyond self-maintenance.

Endless backbreaking tasks in depots, repair shops and construction jobs will be under greater pressure than last time. Austerity will rule. Moments of rest from toil will be spent in deep, cheerless foxholes, not the more comfortable but terribly vulnerable hutments and billets of World War II. Installations completed will suddenly disappear or be horribly shattered in an instant's fiery breath. And survivors will have to restore them in a minimum of time lest the combat they support be irreparably hurt. To the veteran of ETO's Com Zone the change would be like moving from Park Avenue to the slums—and working longer hours for the privilege.

Preparation of an SOP for combat support units working under the ceaseless threat of blast, searing heat and gamma rays will take some thorough thinking. Unpleasant probabilities quickly suggest themselves. Work during hours of darkness, like movement in combat areas, will become standard. This will include the urgent necessity for dispersing time-wise where impractical space-wise. Large-scale movie attendance will be a dangerous luxury. (Improvements in television may eliminate it anyway.) Even mess hours for adjacent units will be staggered, and all other necessary formations. Billets will be designed for protection rather than comfort.

Any attempt to pin down details hits the old snag "it depends upon the situation." Units that operated under blackout in Normandy, trucks 60 yards apart on the road, camouflage nets in place at every halt, roared across France a few weeks later bumper to bumper while headlights blazed. The *Luftwaffe* had been shot out of the air!

Life—or existence—in an active theatre of an atomic war will vary with the G2 estimate of hostile atomic capabilities. If the estimate is too conservative, the plans of generals and the work of sergeants will be unnecessarily difficult. But an unjustified optimism could mean disaster. Atomic warfare, unlike the postman, won't ring twice.

MORALE, esprit, discipline—all those vital intangibles that differentiate between outfits that somehow win through and those that crack up—are going to be so much tougher to maintain. It will be the noncoms, in rear areas, who must maintain them—without benefit of any new psychological "hardware."

Back in Com Zone also are the only probable Theatre of Operations targets

for fusion weapons (H-bombs). Remembering that explosion effects extend in proportion to the cube root of bomb power, an H-bomb 1000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima blast would have a lethal range only ten times as great. Few troop concentrations uniformly cover an area large enough to warrant using such a behemoth. Several good-sized A-bombs, at selected localities, could cause more casualties and possibly at less cost to national stockpiles of critical material.

Only if the prospective target be a major port, a sprawling communications center, a depot covering more than 100 square miles, or similar logistic white elephant, would enemy target analysts squint along the megaton portion of their slide rules. That is another morale problem for the Com Zone soldiers with stripes on their sleeves. Maybe meritorious service wreaths of the future will inclose a miniature mushroom-shaped cloud and their wearers will gaze tolerantly upon Combat Infantryman Badges as Silver Stars now look upon Legion of Merit ribbons.

In any case, whatever the menace of atomic weapons for denizens of huge cities, they pose no picnic for tomorrow's sergeants, regardless of unit. Nor is there any escape in the thought: surely such a war will be of short duration. Human endurance can stand only so much. One side or the other will quickly break.

More than a century ago Jomini wrote emphatically that "the destructiveness of modern weapons precludes long wars." Experts have said that of every marked innovation in warfare's tools. The record doesn't bear out these predictions. More deadly weapons seem to protract, not shorten, armed conflict.

WHAT'S the answer? I doubt if there is one that can be put into brief comprehensible language. Like the Guards' sergeants at Waterloo, like fine sergeants at all times, the noncommissioned officers in atomic warfare can only describe their lot in four-letter words and inspire their units with the guts and initiative that have been the hallmark of American sergeants who were properly trained for their jobs.

Just how well are we performing that training today? Military conservatism, charges of preparing to refight the last war over again, are more easily made than refuted. Who *knows* the trend of a future war? What hunter would, on the trail of a tiger, puts aside his proven rifle for an untested "better" one?

Yet some of those charges have firm foundations. Eminent artillerymen have

stated that the four-gun battery evolved from experiments as to the largest aggregation of pieces a single commander could control by voice commands. Yet we changed to six only many years after voice commands had been relegated to limbo.

What do we mean when we say we will counter atomic weapons by dispersing? Consider only the well publicized 20KT or Hiroshima weapon with its mile radius of casualties against unprotected personnel. Can anyone imagine dispersion *within* tactical units, or major command posts, or numerous types of rear-area installations that would preclude total destruction and still permit a unit, headquarters, or installation to carry out its mission?

Obviously companies of a battalion would be out of contact; staff sections of the headquarters would be strangers to their commander and to each other; operating overhead of the service installation would be prohibitive. Consequently atomic dispersion must be *between*, not *within*, units which are restricted in size in inverse ratio to their capabilities for mobility and communication. Each unit can minimize its vulnerability by digging like moles and taking every precaution against advertising its presence. Frequent moves will make good sense, when possible. The whole prospect adds up to more work, more responsibility, for every sergeant.

NEVERTHELESS, atomic warfare implies more in our favor than the reverse. Its scientific and technical complexities can be mastered by Americans faster than by the citizens of any other nation. Its requirements for superior quality among the most junior military leaders also matches our achievements whenever we have granted those leaders training and schooling adequate to their responsibilities.

We must accept the necessity for down to earth instruction of junior officers and sergeants in the tactics of atomic warfare, for their participation in realistic atomic maneuvers. Occasional, over-empired, semi-secret "simulated explosions" during field exercises, rare opportunities to watch an explosion in Nevada and participate in an utterly unrealistic "tactical" exercise thereafter are poor fare for building the atomic-age noncommissioned officers we shall need. High-level schools, planning and CPXs provide the Army's brain-food, but the backbone and nerve system need nourishment too. It is time that we educate our noncoms in the parts they must play in atomic warfare.



The flooded rice paddies in the lowlands restrict armor to roadways. The jungle-covered uplands also hamper armor.

TERRAIN TAILORS TACTICS IN INDOCHINA

CAPTAIN HARLAN G. KOCH

THE strategy of the war in Indochina is closely related to the major terrain regions of the area. The Communist Viet Minh forces dominate a considerable part of Indochina, but the area they control is mostly sparsely populated,

CAPTAIN HARLAN G. KOCH, Armor, a 1946 graduate of the Military Academy, recently received a graduate degree in geography at the University of Illinois. He served in Korea and Japan, and is soon to leave a Pentagon assignment for duty in Thailand.

mountainous territory. French-Vietnamese forces, on the other hand, control the flat, fertile deltas of the Mekong and Red Rivers, and their operations are directed in large measure toward insuring continued control of these deltas. As major rice-producing areas and as concentrated centers of wealth and population, the deltas are keys to the control of Indochina.

A closer analysis of the terrain of Indochina will explain why it is difficult for the French-Vietnamese forces to expand

their control, and how the specialized battle of Indochina is being fought.

Indochina, which comprises the States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, covers 285,000 square miles, an area approximately that of California and Arizona combined. It extends nearly 1,000 miles from north to south and varies from 125 to 500 miles from east to west.

The population was estimated in 1950 to be 27½ million persons. More than 70 per cent of the total population is crowded into the few fertile lowlands.

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

Approximately two-thirds of Indochina is mountainous. These mountains cover practically all of the north and northwest and extend the entire length of Indochina. They parallel, and in places adjoin, the coast for most of its length. Although not particularly high, they are extremely rugged and broken. The dense forest cover and the numerous streams in deep gorges are barriers to movement and are unfavorable to large-scale, mechanized, military operations. The streams normally are torrential from May through September. Vehicles in the mountainous areas are limited almost entirely to roads.

Indochina has two major coastal deltas: the delta of the Red River, in the north; and the extensive delta of the Mekong River, in the south. These two strategic lowland areas comprise less than one-fifth of the country's total area, but contain the major portion of Indochina's population; the major cities; and the chief centers of agriculture, manufacturing, commerce, and governmental administration.

These two deltas have the best-developed transportation networks in Indochina. Hanoi in the north and Saigon in the south are the focal cities upon which numerous routes converge. It is in these key strategic areas that France has the firmest control. *Possession of the two major delta areas insures strategic control of the entire country.*

THE Red River Delta appears on the map as a wedge driven along the axis of the Red River into the mountains. This lowland is extremely flat, averaging only 10 feet above sea level. It is interrupted by low, steep, limestone hills and ridges, particularly on the inland margins of the plain. Numerous caves in the limestone hills provide natural underground storage spaces. The entire plain is covered with rice paddies.

Where the Red River and other large streams flow out of the mountains onto the delta, their channels divide and then further subdivide until the entire area is compartmentalized. During the rainy season, the streams are swollen and the rice fields are often flooded and deep in mud. The only areas suitable for movement of conventional vehicles during the rainy season are on the levees, the all-weather roads, and along the well-drained inland margins of the plain.

During the dry winter season (November through April) conditions for movement are much improved. The larger streams, however, are generally unfordable because of their depth, soft muddy banks, and soft muddy bottoms.

Parts of the plain remain soggy or flooded during most of the year. Off-road movement of wheeled vehicles is greatly restricted even in the dry season because of the many paddy dikes and ditches. Operational maneuver is primarily confined to foot soldiers armed with light weapons. Tanks may provide support by delivering overwatching fire, but they are restricted principally to the roads within the sector of operations unless they are operating on the better-drained margins of the Red River plain.

The delta of the Mekong River, focusing on Saigon, is similar to the Red River Delta. It is almost level except for a few low, rounded hills. Military operations conducted in this area are also similar to those in the Red River Delta; the foot soldier is the most reliable maneuvering element. Special equipment, i.e., amphibious vehicles, have difficulty in crossing the paddy land and marshes.

The strategic significance of the two delta areas contributes to their importance and probable selection as key ob-

jectives. Neither delta is well-suited for direct amphibious attack on its shore. The offshore waters of both regions are generally very shallow, muddy and fringed in many places with mangrove thickets or belts of mangrove forests. Along the Vietnam coast, north of the Red River Delta, the beaches are obstructed by numerous offshore islands and are backed by rice fields which are inundated for almost the entire year. Most of the Vietnam coastline south of the Red River Delta appears to be suitable for landing. The beaches along this coast are mainly long, sandy stretches and are relatively clear of offshore obstructions. Due to rice fields and streams, exits from these beach areas appear to be generally unfavorable except, so far as can be determined from topographic maps, in the vicinities of towns which have access to the north-south coastal highway. Surf and swell would create problems frequently from November through January.

Indochina's roads are not good. The





Deep in the jungle, French troops captured a Viet Minh arms dump.

principal roads are narrow and are primarily fair-weather or limited all-weather roads. The meter-gauged railroad system is at present extensively damaged and for all practical purposes serves only the areas contiguous to the cities of Hanoi and Saigon. In the current war small bodies of troops (battalion and lower) and particularly guerrilla forces use the numerous trails.

The extensive highways immediately in and around Hanoi and Saigon are of fairly good construction, whereas the least-developed roads are those which cross the central mountainous chain of the country. The few roads which cross the mountains to connect the Mekong River north-south road with the coastal north-south road and rail route utilize passes at 1,300 to 2,500 feet above sea level and are easily controlled by small guerrilla forces. Lowland flooding or rock slides impede traffic on all routes throughout Indochina. Outside the two strategic delta areas the roads of Indochina have been cut or occupied in many places by Viet Minh forces.

The Viet Minh forces receive the bulk of their supplies from southern China over this inadequate road system.

The generally hot, humid weather of Indochina reduces the efficiency of men and animals, is conducive to sickness, and presents many obstacles to military operations.

The characteristic annual precipitation for the largest part of Indochina is

50 to 115 inches with the mountainous sections receiving the greater share of the rain. This torrent requires special protection for supplies and matériel.

ONLY 14 percent of Indochina has been cleared of its natural vegetation. In the mountains and in hilly regions the natural vegetation is mostly tropical rain forest, the most impenetrable type of jungle in the world. It consists of closely spaced trees that are as high as 190 feet. Dense undergrowth, thickly entangled with vines, makes it nearly impossible for an individual to move cross-country. The delta areas and small coastal plains are intensively planted to rice and other seasonal crops. In the Mekong River Delta there are also large expanses of tall and short savannah grasses and marsh grasses.

Both the natural vegetation and the agricultural crops, particularly rice, impede the movement of troops. The flooded rice paddies considerably hamper movement, except where, during the dry season, they are planted to dry crops or allowed to remain fallow. Movement over steep, rugged, jungle-covered mountainous terrain is extremely difficult even for infantry troops. Numerous foot and pack trails cross the jungle, but only a few roads penetrate it.

Malaria, plague, typhus, cholera, typhoid, and amoebic dysentery are prevalent and can be principally attributed to contaminated food and water or to

insects. Strangely enough, malaria exists principally in the mountainous territory while the swampy deltaic areas are practically free of malaria. This operates to the advantage of the French-Vietnamese forces who are mainly holding the low ground, and is a distinct disadvantage to the Viet Minh who must combat the medical problems of malaria in addition to other activities. The lack of medicine is one of the critical items of the mountain-based Viet Minh troops.

THE basic tactical principles of the Viet Minh Army are a result of the terrain. In the defense Viet Minh forces organize key terrain features such as villages, hills, forests, and defiles, and then maneuver between these positions with a mobile force to harass or to attack French-Vietnamese probing forces. If the Viet Minh are pressed too closely, they break up into small groups, scatter among the villages, and even mix with the inhabitants. Thus they rarely offer a feasible target for aircraft or artillery. Cohesion is maintained by the fractioning of all units down to teams of three men each. In broken terrain this procedure not only facilitates rapid concentration, rapid transmission of orders, rapid break-up, but it also promotes teamwork and *esprit*.

The Viet Minh make hit-and-run night attacks upon objectives with such swiftness that the reaction of the opposing forces is usually too late. The objective is then occupied or destroyed before reinforcements arrive.

The Viet Minh forces use the ground to their advantage and attach considerable importance to intelligence. They commit themselves only after detailed reconnaissance. During the assembling and the moving to an attack, they avoid the local populace as a counterintelligence measure. Quite frequently, for deceptive purposes, the attack is launched against an objective 13 to 20 miles from the departure or assembly area. The lightly equipped soldiers march over reconnoitered forest trails sometimes for two nights before reaching the objective. This type of mobility allows the Viet Minh to gain surprise by intervening against one or the other of two widely separated fronts in a short amount of time. When a preponderance of French-Vietnamese troops are assembled, the Viet Minh breaks off a particular assault and strikes elsewhere.

The primary objective of the Viet Minh is not to win terrain but rather to win battles in order to win the support of the population. The battles are won by the skillful use of terrain.

Guerrilla forces can control the roads that snake through jungle uplands.

Viet Minh soldiers disguised as women, fishermen, peasants or French-Vietnamese troops infiltrate and then re-assemble into units, usually battalion-size, behind the French-Vietnamese positions. This tactic is facilitated by the 3-man team organization and by the lack of a continuous French-Vietnamese defense line. The teams infiltrate between the French-Vietnamese blockhouses, quickly concentrate, inflict heavy casualties, and then disperse before becoming too involved.

THE French-Vietnamese, when operating in the strategically important flat deltas, are able to use their tanks and heavy artillery. But when they make forays into the mountainous jungle areas they must lighten their equipment and adapt their tactics to those of the Viet Minh. In addition, the French-Vietnamese have the advantage of air support. This advantage not only permits them to put parachute troops on the ground at any point without warning, but it also furnishes them with air supply and evacuation in support of such operations. When a raiding mission is completed the parachuted troops fight their way back to their base by guerrilla tactics.

A study of the terrain in Indochina explains the nature of the war in that country. The situation is quite similar, tactically, to combat in the Southwest Pacific area during World War II. One force with modern equipment holds the important ground while the other force employs guerrilla tactics from the jungled hinterland. This situation occurred repeatedly on various Pacific islands.

STRATEGICALLY, however, Indochina presents a problem that is different from that faced in the Southwest Pacific. Large numbers of troops would be required to blockade the sources of supply to the lightly equipped Viet Minh. In World War II, United States command of the sea severed the exterior supply lines of each island, leaving the Japanese at the mercy of mop-up operations. This strategic difference, arising from the insularity of one and the existence of continuous overland supply lines in the other, explains the difficulty encountered so far in executing decisive actions in Indochina. For this geographic reason the exhaustive and seemingly endless conflict in Indochina may continue for some time to come.



The Month's Reading

Initiative Breeds Leadership

LT. GEN. L. K. TRUSCOTT
Command Missions
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954

In promoting initiative and leadership among junior officers and men, I insisted that battle was a simple business when conducted by common sense methods, and by soldiers who were physically fit and knew how to use their weapons, were capable of working and living together in the field as a team, and were disciplined to withstand hardship and danger in attaining the objective. I would not permit any junior officer to be punished for any mistake when he was acting on his own initiative. On the other hand, I insisted that all commanders deal harshly with failure to act boldly when the situation required it. The change was gradual, but the development of leadership in the 3d Infantry Division was marked and a cause for intense satisfaction.

Improved Brain-Washing

EDWARD HUNTER
The New Leader
March 1954

It is safe to assume that whenever free men fall into the hands of the Reds they will be subjected to [brain-washing]. Mind manipulation is still the most important weapon of the Communist apparatus. Moreover, in the future we can expect the "treatment" to be much more efficient. The Communists are making an intense study of their practices in prisoner-of-war camps, to find out where they were ineffective and how they can improve their tactics.

We can be sure they will not repeat the foolish mistake they made when they showed a group of our POWs some "germ-infested" bugs that were supposedly dropped by our fliers. One of our men casually picked up a bug and swallowed it. The fact that he did not suffer even the slightest discomfort was a devastating blow to the entire Communist project. Next time, however, we can be sure that the bugs will be so full of germs that anyone who touches them will die in agony right before the eyes of his buddies. What could be more convincing to naive young Americans who have not been told the facts about Soviet procedures?

Why We Fight

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN
The Saturday Evening Post
27 February 1954

I've mentioned before my acute embarrassment when a North Korean interrogator asked me, "Did you personally explain to your men why they were fighting?" and I had to lie to him, because I had neglected to do that during the twenty days while I led troops in Korea, although I had always made a point of it in Europe and in Japan. Of all the resolutions I made in three years, I think this one—never

to let this happen to me again—is the most durable. I believe it could be expanded to a general principle.

We, each of us, need to know exactly why we're fighting, in Korea or anywhere else. An army can be a show window for democracy only if every man in it is convinced that it does fight for a free world, for the kind of government he wants himself—and that he personally represents the ideals which can make a world free. Lip service is not enough. We must live our ideals; it isn't what we say that counts, in the long run. It's what we do and how we do it.

I am a troop commander and in no sense a politician, and, of course, I speak for no one else. But I do believe these things: That we must present a factual world better than the communist dream; that we must have political answers simple enough for the dullest to understand; that we must, each of us, know and understand the things for which we fight. If I learned anything in captivity, these were the lessons.

Hole in the Reservoir

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS
The St. Louis Post Dispatch
17 January 1954

The third aspect of the new strategy, the creation of a strategic reserve in the United States "which greatly improves our defensive posture," is another simple and beguiling concept.

From our central position between Europe and Asia this reserve can move in any direction to put out fires. The start toward building the strategic reserve is being made by the withdrawal of two divisions from Korea.

But, alas, for the strategic reserve, present plans call for a reduction in Army forces of substantially greater numbers than are presently to be withdrawn from the Far East. No reserve will be created because the Army will be reduced faster than troops will be brought home.

Army Will Carry On

SENATE DEBATE ON U.S. DEFENSE
U.S. News and World Report
26 February 1954

SENATOR [LEVERETT] SALTONSTALL: I would not be frank if I did not say that the Army, whose appropriations have been cut by 1.5 or 2 billion dollars, does not like the cut. But never in all the hearings, to the best of my recollection, has it been said that we are relying solely on atomic power or the ability to carry the atomic bomb. We are relying upon our ability to retaliate. We are relying upon building up a warning system in this country, so that we may be in a position to retaliate if we are attacked.

I will say to my colleague from Washington that, so far as I know, the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the new Chief of Staff of the Navy, together with the Secretaries of those two branches, are in complete accord with the budget

allowances for this year. I cannot truthfully say that the Secretary of the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Army is in full accord, but they realize that they have only a certain amount to work with and they will work with it . . .

* * *

SENATOR [HENRY M. JACKSON]: Is it not a fact that the Chief of Staff for the Army is opposed to the new policy?

SENATOR SALTONSTALL: I would not say that he is opposed to the new policy. What I would say—and he was utterly frank about it—is that, because the number of Army divisions has been reduced, the Army has been forced to make new plans and new assignments and to work out new methods of doing things. He was not in complete accord, of course, with the policy of cutting appropriations for the Army by a substantial amount.

However, he did state emphatically that he was willing to go forward and that they were making new plans, and that the Army would co-operate to the fullest extent. I believe my colleagues who were present at the hearing will bear me out in that regard. . . .

No Place for Pity

LT. GEN. L. K. TRUSCOTT
Command Missions
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954

One must actually experience the hardships of war to understand the awful strain, both mental and physical, which battle imposes upon men, the dreadful fatigue and fear which destroys the will and poisons every fiber. . . . I had observed a tendency on the part of commanders and comrades to sympathize and pity. I felt little of these sentiments during battle, and moreover felt we could not permit them to deflect men from their duty. We could not give way to weariness for that would only give the enemy an advantage. We could not allow able-bodied men to take care of wounded or sick comrades until the battle was won. This drive is an important function of command.

Fustest and Cheapest

JAC WELLER
Military Affairs
Winter, 1953

Nothing was more important to the spirit of [Nathan Bedford] Forrest's troops, nor to their confidence in him, than the very real concern he showed for their lives. In spite of his fighting ability and his many adjurations of getting in the first blow—"getting a bulge" on the enemy and "keeping the scare on them," as he called it, with continuous attacks—Forrest was not a reckless commander. His men knew it. His famous "hit 'em on the end" remark—attack from the flank and rear—was part of Forrest's general economy of the lives of his men. He was most emphatically against the frontal attack that Hood made at Franklin, and against Wheeler's efforts to storm Fort Donelson. For him, and because of him, men accomplished tasks requiring epic physical endurance. Yet he realized what men could not do. He also realized that some victories were not worthwhile even if they could be achieved if the cost in lives was too great.

APRIL 1954

Few men who ever fought have been such a master of bluff as Forrest. On literally dozens of occasions, he caused Union garrisons and even small armies in the field to surrender to his great superiority in men and guns—to stop the further effusion of blood as he phrased it—when in actuality Forrest had only a small fraction of the force he claimed.

Objective Is the Same

WALTER MILLIS
The New York Herald Tribune
19 January 1954

One could wage conventional warfare with atomic weapons and it would still be conventional warfare; one could wage strategic warfare with plagues of locusts or Roman triremes and it would still be strategic. The object of both is always the same: it is to bend or break the will of the enemy state. Strategic warfare, however, seeks to accomplish this by direct attack upon the lives, the livelihoods, the resources, the industrial plant, communications, wealth and earning power of the enemy people and the enemy state as a whole. Conventional warfare, on the other hand, seeks the object by physical invasion and occupation of the enemy state, in order to capture or overawe its governmental "will", this usually involving in the first instance destruction of the armies or fortifications which it has thrown up for defense.

Interdiction in Korea

LT. COL. S. B. FOLSOM
Marine Corps Gazette
January 1954

Generally speaking, a route is less vulnerable to attack than the vehicles which are supported by that route. This proposition is based on the assumption that vulnerability is not judged alone on assailability but rather on the lasting effect of these assaults. In Korea we did not produce lasting effects in our interdiction effort. A proclamation of complete failure is not intended here—the program simply did not produce what it should have. With air superiority over the enemy's communication areas, movement of sufficient traffic to support a large army even in a stalemate could have been made impossible. The fact that an enemy force succeeded under such pressures proved his ability to outthink and, therefore, outmaneuver us.

How did this happen? Our original concept was apparently solid—all traffic was attacked with such efficiency that nothing of any size could move on enemy-held roads during the day. Where the solid concept failed is reflected in that one word "day." We knew our target element to start with—traffic! We hit the vehicles—we stopped them. Then the enemy took to the cover of darkness and we did not follow him—we changed our target element. Some night effort was made but the large majority of missions continued during the daylight hours. Being unable to shift our weight we were carried by our momentum into a program of route plowing. The earth was churned, but being earth, suffered little lasting damage. Bomb craters were filled in, broken bridges by-passed and supplies moved forward.

27

If we are to survive, the new weapons must be harnessed to the Army's proudest tradition; the spirit that has made

CELERITY: Secret of Success

COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

THE United States Army possesses a proud tradition. In all its military victories a vital element has been its offensive spirit, in which celerity, "that secret of success," predominated. Celerity of movement, and celerity of mind are the American ways to success in battle.

It is interesting to note that this tradition of celerity, the spirit which in 1918 changed a stalemate of trench warfare into hammer-blows of fire and movement, which in 1943-1945 tumbled one *blitzkrieg* into the dust of a more potent *blitzkrieg*, stems from the war which was itself the prototype of lightning war—our own Civil War.

It came about as the result of the work of one man—Dennis Hart Mahan—Colonel, U.S.A., and Professor of Engineering and the Art of War at West Point from 1830 to 1871. Mahan was the man who, even prior to the Mexican War, was telling cadets that no great success in war could be attained without rapid movements.

Let's get down to facts. In the Civil War the vital strokes affecting the course of military events were, all of them, strokes in which celerity—speed, swiftness—entered as vital factors. Jackson in the Valley, Grant's Big Black River operation, Warren's *coup d'oeil* at Little Round Top, Sherman's march to the sea, Wilson's Selma campaign, Sheridan's cavalry on the *via dolorosa* leading to Appomattox; these are some of the lightning strokes which stand out for immediate inspection.

The railroads, the telegraph, balloons, torpedoes, mines—booby-traps, even; the revolver and repeating rifle that revolutionized cavalry action from that of shock to fire and movement; these were some of the developments "used," as Henderson writes, "in a manner hitherto unknown . . . even the formations of infantry were made sufficiently elastic to meet the requirements of a modern battlefield."

It was lightning war, geared to the relative speed of the horse, ushering into the world a future in which Toynbee's "mechanical cataphracts and winged archers" would strut the stage. The lessons learned would be utilized by alien soldiers on a thousand stricken fields until at last used again by the grandsons and great-grandsons of the men who wore the Blue and the Gray.

It is easy to say that this was expression of the buoyancy and ingenuity of a young nation; that it was an expression of the pioneer spirit which was transforming a wilderness and expanding a nation; that it was part of the spirit that almost simultaneously built the Union Pacific. Not only is this easy to say, but it is true. Was

it, however, a spontaneous combustion, or was there some directing force, some educational guidance, even leaven in the mass?


TURN back to Mahan, and remember as you turn that he was not only a professor of the art of war, but also professor of engineering in the school which fathered our system of technological education. One can say with truth that Mahan systemized the study and practice of civil engineering.

The goal of his teachings was a flexibility of mind which, seizing upon new weapons and techniques, could utilize them with the versatility of an Alexander, the mobility of a Caesar, the strategical genius of a Hannibal and a Napoleon, to crush the most sensitive parts of an enemy structure.


Mobility, speed, surprise, boldness—these were Mahan's keynotes; his springboard was the achievements of the great captains of the past. Into the minds of generations of cadets Mahan drummed the necessity for study of the past, together with a mental flexibility which would distinguish between the principles there presented, and the tactical and technical employment of the weapons available.

"It seems incredible," he wrote in 1847, "that anything short of the most entire ignorance of the past, could have led professional soldiers to abandon the *spirit* of the organization and tactics of the ancient Greeks and Romans . . . of those rapid combinations by which, with a handful of troops, Caesar so uniformly frustrated the powerful and oft-repeated struggles of a warlike and restless people. The study of military history thus becomes very instructive in a strategical point of view . . . On the other hand, in endeavoring to apply the . . . tactics of the ancients to our modern armies, errors of the greatest magnitude might be committed. Every servile imitation . . . is greatly to be deprecated . . . Misapprehension of the value of a new agent renders all celerity, that secret of success, impossible."

HE made no pretense that he was inventing some new solution for victory on the battlefield. On the contrary, he scorned the suggestion that any new theory or any one new weapon could change strategical principles, no matter how much it would affect tactics. He was the scientist, the laboratory expert, dissecting the specimens, evolving theories, proving them from the past and enunciating them as principles for the future.



Celerity is the word for the swift sweep across France in the hot midsummer of 1944.



DENNIS HART MAHAN

"No great success can be gained in war in which rapid movements do not enter as an element. Even the very elements of Nature seem to array themselves against the slow and over-prudent general."

COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY, Artillery, retired, is the author of many books, the latest being *Men of West Point*, written for the Military Academy's 150th birthday in 1952.

To his satisfaction he proved that war is fluid, proceeding from bases and lines of communication. The spade, implementing the terrain, could be as important as the rifle and bayonet. One of his pupils, Sherman—who, by the way, kept up a correspondence with his old mentor, as did others—later would write:

"It was one of Professor Mahan's maxims that the spade was as useful in war as the musket, and to this I will add the axe."

THE point to be made is that the Civil War was, by and large, a West Pointers' war, and to that extent a demonstration of a single theory of war used by both sides. With the exception of Forrest, one of those rare natural leaders who spring to light from time to time, high commanders with West Point background predominated. Of sixty of the most important engagements, fifty-five were led on both sides by graduates; of the remaining five, one side or the other was commanded by a West Pointer.

These men were pupils of Mahan or, with rare exceptions like Lee—for three years closely associated with him when he was superintendent, during the best period of Mahan's life—they were familiar with and in sympathy with his teachings. Among the officers who came in from civil life on both sides, Mahan's works, now long forgotten, had wide circulation. Pirated editions were produced for Confederate use.

THAT not all Mahan's pupils were Napoleons, and that not all held open minds, cannot be held against the doctrine and the tradition. No more can our present great system of technological education be held responsible for the fact that not all its output are Baches, Michelsons or Millikans.

The clincher is that out of the Civil War period came an American tradition and a doctrine—the spirit of the offensive—and that it came with a number of proponents, not just one isolated great captain. We had a Washington in the Revolution; we had nobody to speak of during the War of 1812; we had a Winfield Scott and a Zachary Taylor (both with West Point staffs) in the Mexican War. But we had Grant, Lee, Sherman, Jackson, Sheridan, Wilson, Jubal Early and a host of lesser lights to practice lightning war by 1865.

We also had, it is true, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker and a number of others who did not practice or did not heed what Mahan preached. They were of the type of men Mahan meant when he wrote:

"... An active, intelligent officer, with an imagination fertile in the expedients of his profession, will seldom be at a loss as to his best course when the occasion offers; to one without those qualities, opportunities present themselves in vain."

The tradition would continue, in the long and sometimes frustrating years of our little wars against the plains Indians, in the greatest irregular light cavalry the world has produced. The outstanding exponent of celerity in these was, of course, Crook, the greatest Indian fighter of them all, whose nimbleness of mind and undying spirit of the offensive stood out in his stripped-saddle opera-

tions of 1876-1877—the Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition against Crazy Horse.

The tradition was in the doldrums during the Spanish-American War. But it cropped out in the small actions of the Philippine Insurrection and in the Boxer campaign. The growth of our service schools fostered it and paved the way for another demonstration.

CELERITY was the keynote of granite-faced Pershing's leadership in World War I; a celerity which was complemented by the celerity of the nation behind him and its technological advances—railroad building, harbor construction and all the other developments on logistics, transported overseas. But today's world thinks of Pershing—if it thinks of him at all—as a monolith of tenacity. And one does not associate monoliths with speed.

But remember this: On September 1, 1918, Pershing pledged Foch that within twenty-four days he would fight his AEF at St. Mihiel, win his objective, and then, with practically the same army, launch a major offensive—the Meuse-Argonne—sixty miles away.

The mind that can carry into execution two great battles, winning the one and launching the other to eventual victory, within such bracket of time and space, is indeed governed by the spirit of celerity. Furthermore, unless his subordinates were motivated by the same doctrine and tradition, Pershing's pledge would have been but a sorry boast.

And so we come to our greatest effort, and to a tradition by that time in full flower. How else does one explain the operations of our forces in Europe and in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945?

True, the United States, when World War II engulfed us, was bound by the shackles of that chain mentioned by Toynbee, "each link of which has been a cycle of invention, triumph, lethargy and disaster." We were near that "lethargy and disaster" when Pearl Harbor occurred. But what happened after is in the full flavor of that tradition of celerity, in which the entire nation joined.

IN Europe we find a wealth of celerity. It is hard indeed to find one instance, great or small, in those operations in which it was not an element, from Patton's four-pronged race through France and his later crisscross slashes in the Palatinate, to the leadership of unnamed platoon commanders. To single out one at the cost of silence about the others might be unjust, indeed.

But we will take one, because it discloses a mass celerity of mind as well as of matter; a celerity stemming from bottom to top and back again, and effecting a chain-reaction of imposing importance. To preface it we look on the words of two great men; they indicate the true meaning of celerity in war.

Wrote Patton: "One does not plan and then try to make circumstances fit those plans; one tries to make the plans fit the circumstances."

And wrote Mahan, one hundred years previously: "Once within the sphere of the enemy's operations, a commanding general is no longer at liberty to do what he

wishes, but what best he can. Marches, maneuvers, combats, depend upon circumstances for the most part imperative; decisions arrived at are often sudden, and brought about by the attitude, resources, strength and the morale of the enemy."

LET'S look at what General Devers has dubbed "the miracle of Remagen."

When Task Force Engeman of Hoge's Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, nosed over the *Appolinaris Kirche* ridge to find the thin gray strands of the Remagen bridge still spanning the muddy Rhine on 7 March 1945, its commander rushed to grab it, flashing back the news. Hoge hastened to make the capture certain, relaying word back at the same time. From Division to Corps, from Corps to Army, up to Army Group, the electric word went, each commander in turn approving, each one adding to the onward tide. Bradley called Eisenhower at Rheims.

"Brad, that's wonderful!" Ike shouted, according to Harry Butcher's narration of the scene. "Sure, get across with everything you've got . . . To hell with the planners!"

At the time Eisenhower planned a full-dress river crossing and envelopment of the Ruhr from the north by Montgomery, while Bradley and Devers would contain.

But when Hodges's First Army made good that bridgehead; when Patton, unleashed in the Hunsrück, made mincemeat out of remaining enemy forces south of the Moselle and then, popping over the Rhine one day before Montgomery's crossing, began his own sweep through Western Germany, Bradley had presented Ike with an entirely new situation. Ike passed the ball to him. Brad would be the hammer, Monty the anvil.

And there you have it. A junior commander, seizing initiative to take a bridge, brings about the greatest double envelopment in military history—325,000 German soldiers caught in a bearhug encompassing a 4,000-square-mile area. Chain reaction of celerity in war; "celerity, that secret of success."

LOOK now at the masterpiece of celerity in the far Pacific. It is 15 September 1944. MacArthur is planning an invasion of the Philippines with Mindanao, southernmost island, his objective. His Sixth Army's assault is targeted for 20 December. The XXIV Corps, under Nimitz's control, is afloat—another show—aimed at Yap; bold Bull Halsey's carrier force is already screening it by attacking enemy air bases in the Philippines.

Halsey, finding unexpected weaknesses in Japanese aerial opposition in the central Philippines, flashes Nimitz, recommending abandonment of present plans against Yap, Talaud and Mindanao; suggests instead attack on Leyte, center of the archipelago. Nimitz, approving, flashes the Joint Chiefs, offering his own amphibious strength, the XXIV Corps, in reinforcement.

The Joint Chiefs place the project before MacArthur. Forty-eight hours later the answer comes. MacArthur is prepared to assault Leyte on 20 October—two months earlier than the original Mindanao schedule.

Once again one has seen celerity in action; the celerity which is prepared not only to make the plans fit the circumstances, but also, as Krueger would prove with his Sixth Army, swiftly execute them.

It would seem, then, from these samplings, that our military history indicates a tradition of celerity, the spirit of the offensive, that sprang directly from the Civil War, and that the seed was planted at West Point. If, in the reading, it might appear that the writer had slighted the operations and the great tradition of the U.S. Navy, let it be remembered that the doctrines and initiative of that service, too, have been fostered by a man born at West Point—Alfred Thayer Mahan, illustrious son of an illustrious father.

WHAT now of the future? How does our tradition fit into this age of electronics and atomic energy? It would appear to be logical to hope that this tradition will be fostered. We live in an era of instantaneousness of communication and of breath-taking scope of striking range; an era in which the distance between the quick and the dead, and the time element available for command decision, are ever shortening.

It's an era in which the vacillation of one of Mahan's "slow and over-prudent" generals could bring about a disaster of magnitude unparalleled.

We are faced by potential danger not only to a far-flung perimeter embracing our allies of the Western World, but also to our homeland. We have an army, we have the most powerful navy in the world, we have an air force. We possess atomic and electronic weapons. In other words, we have the elements of a team on which this trinity of power must play in perfect coordination to get the best results.

IT is a strength not to be frittered away, either by projects of cordon defense or by rosy dreams of push-button war. The true power and limitations of new agents must be weighed, and weighed accurately, to attain Mahan's "celerity, that secret of success."

And we must not be misled, either by impetuosity or by the valor of ignorance. We must remember that this tradition of celerity may be a two-edged sword when misused.

"Who," wrote Mahan, "intent upon some striking success, rushes recklessly, in the pursuit of it, within the jaws of destruction, has learned but half his trade, and that the most easily acquired and the most dangerous in its application in such hands."

We should remember Baker, stumbling to death up a steep Potomac bluff in the valor of ignorance. We should remember Pope's snap judgment at Second Bull Run, Stuart's ride around the Army of the Potomac while Lee was losing Gettysburg, Custer charging to disaster on the Little Big Horn. They did not possess true celerity, but impetuosity. They were the men who leaped before they looked.

So, while cherishing our tradition of "celerity, that secret of success," let's remember also another cliché: "make haste slowly."



Shaping up for Exercise Flash Burn, the 663d Field Artillery fires the big 280mm gun. Earth tremors caused by the gun shake the camera and result in some picture distortion.

CFJ Staff Report

PREVIEW TO FLASH BURN

WHILE the Army's new weapons—specifically the 280mm gun and the Honest John field artillery rocket—will get the headlines, Exercise Flash Burn, to be run off in the North Carolina maneuver area in April and May, is much more than a public spectacle of the Army's show pieces.

The 60,000-man maneuver will see some rather ambitious parachute and air-landed operations, including the supply of a corps' airhead by parachute and

air-landing methods; two companies of Army helicopters will be used, as well as light aircraft.

The experimental infantry regiment will be field tested by the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, which has been at that test now for many months. Basically the experimental squad has eleven men armed with M1s and two automatic rifles. The Heavy Weapons Company was abolished; its machine guns were placed in each rifle company, and the 81mm mortars and 105mm recoilless rifles in the Battalion Headquarters Company. Signal communication procedures have been streamlined with more field telephone service and improved radios.

Service and support units have been strengthened and simplified in an effort to speed up administrative and logistical work. The lessons of Flash Burn may suggest changes in the experimental infantry regiment and will help determine whether it or a similar organization should be standardized.

Flash Burn will test: defense against enemy air attack, active and passive; defense against coordinated tactical atomic employment; operational use of new and improved weapons; land mine warfare; retrograde movement with demolitions; tactics and techniques of guerrilla warfare; survival training; electronic countermeasures; alternate communications; rail, motor and air troop movements; Air-ground, night and day logistical support; civil affairs and military government; and tactical employment and defense against chemical, biological and radiological devices.


The G2 play has been carefully plotted and is a logical follow-up to the Aggressor operations in previous maneu-

vers in the area; notably Southern Pines in 1951 and Swarmer in 1950. Real Aggressor captured personnel will furnish the U.S. troops with intelligence information. Planted documents and equipment loaded with tactical and technical information will also be used. In keeping with current Aggressor tactics clandestine operations will be emphasized. Every trick of the trade will be used to keep S2s and G2s on their toes.

The Aggressor commander will be assisted in painting a real live picture of his force to the U.S. force by the 304th MI Company, organized into an Intelligence Injection Detachment. This unit will prepare cover stories for Aggressor soldiers to be injected for capture, documents and matériel intended for U.S. intelligence officers, and Aggressor clandestine agents.

The principal units participating in Flash Burn are the XVIII Corps, the 37th Infantry and the 82d Airborne Divisions, and the 306th Logistical Command. Altogether some 165 smaller units and detachments will participate.

The largest Aggressor units will be the 278th Infantry Regiment and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.



Slight Singe, an exercise that was a preliminary to Flash Burn, saw the heavy drop of jeeps and 105mm howitzers.



LIEUT. GEN. A. R. BOLLING
Flash Burn Director

Lieutenant General A. R. Bolling, Third Army commander, is maneuver director. His deputies are Major General Edward T. Williams, Deputy Commander Third Army, and Major General Joseph P. Cleland, Commanding XVIII Corps. Colonel Glenn J. McGowan is Aggressor commander. The chief umpire is Brigadier General Claude M. McQuarrie.



You'll work hard in Germany. The Seventh Army is in the field most of the time. But you'll also have time to play.

GERMANY

You can count on waiting many weeks for the family

MAJOR MARCO POLO

WEST GERMANY, defended by the United States, Great Britain and France, appears to be well on the way to emerging from the economic chaos left by World War II. Business is booming, the shops are full, and the factories are turning out enough goods for local consumption with some left over for export.

While Russia still "occupies" East Germany, with all the restrictions the term implies, in West Germany our troops and those of France and Great Britain have a protective role. Germany has no armed forces, so the American soldier is at once the neighbor and guardian of people he was fighting just a few years ago. Possibly more important, he

is, or should be, a teacher instilling the lessons of democracy by his personal words and actions.

Germany is a small country by American standards—only a little more than

AROUND THE BASES—4

This article covers West Germany only. Since Berlin is an island in the Russian zone, it poses special problems which will be covered in a future article.

half the size of Texas. It is thickly populated, and before the war had more than 500 cities of 10,000 population or more. The people gather together whenever they can. In rural areas you will find clusters of houses rather than the isolated farmsteads of America.

Northern Germany is flat and not particularly good farm land. It has a great deal of scrub woodland, as well as marsh land and hundreds of small lakes. In central Germany the land is hilly and the soil is rich and in southern Germany—Bavaria—it is mountainous. Many people consider Bavaria to be among the most beautiful regions in the world.

The climate resembles that of the

eastern seaboard of the United States, between New York and Washington. Winters, however, are long and while not extremely cold, are raw, damp and dreary. Summer is seldom particularly hot, although you will suffer through an occasional day when the temperature hits 90, and humidity is high. Annual rainfall is about the same as on the east coast of the United States, but it is spread out more in year-round drizzles. Winter uniform is prescribed for the entire year, although during summer months tropical wear is permitted off-duty. So are civilian clothes.

THE normal tour in Germany is three years. The soldier can expect a long wait for his family. Officially, the Army says the wait will be from 35 to 39 weeks, but actually it varies according to the area to which the soldier is assigned. In Heidelberg the wait for quarters is four to six months; in Stuttgart six months; in Munich only about three weeks.

But no matter how rapidly you get quarters, it will take your dependents at least two months to get to Germany. No dependents may start the trip until their sponsor has arrived in Germany, been assigned, and has obtained a quarters allocation. By the time the passports are issued, orders cut, and dependents report to the port, 60 days usually elapse. Then there is a nine-day boat trip (or 24-hour airplane ride) before they set foot in Germany.

From the port of Bremerhaven you travel to your station by rail or private automobile. Aircraft normally fly out of Westover Field, Massachusetts, landing at Frankfurt.

Once you get it, your housing will be quite satisfactory. There is a rather complicated allocation system, depending on rank and length of time away from dependents and to a certain extent on assignment, but the quarters are all good. Most of them are apartments, some leased from the Germans and others built by the United States; a few are houses. In Munich most quarters are houses; in Stuttgart they are all apartments. German or American built, there is very little difference except for closets—American buildings have them, German do not. In the latter you will be provided huge wardrobes. The number of rooms in your quarters will depend on the number of persons in your family.

(One officer we know, assigned to Heidelberg, got quarters in two weeks. He has five kids. Folk less liberally endowed wait at least four months.)

The quarters are all well furnished, and they are complete with rugs, china,

glass, silver, curtains, draperies and blankets. In a few cases linens are provided, but this is unusual. Baby furniture is not provided. You will have to bring (or buy in the PX) cribs and similar furnishings.

YOU must hire servants yourself. The local army headquarters normally maintains a servants' registry, and will recommend whatever help you want. Most of the help has worked for Americans before, and speaks (or understands) a little English. Wages currently run at about \$18 a month for a part-time general housemaid (she also cooks) to \$28 for full-time help. There are servants' quarters with nearly all family housing.

You will probably want to take your own pictures, lamps, and bric-a-brac, but it is not wise to take too much, or anything you are particularly eager not to have broken. Most people who spend a tour in Germany load their what-nots with local items. After all, Germany is the home of both Meissen and Dresden.

You will need your own household linens, kitchen utensils, and small electrical appliances. An electric roaster would be helpful because German stoves have tiny ovens. Your toaster, waffle iron, mixer, vacuum cleaner, and so on will all come in handy, but one word of caution. In some of the U.S.-built quarters the electric current is standard American 110 volt, 60 cycle. But generally in Germany the current is 220 volt, 50 cycle, and you will have to have your equipment converted, or arm yourself with transformers. Transformers are available on the German market, and frequently in the PXs. But for radios, record players and washing machines, have the conversion kit attached before you leave the States, because many people have had bad luck having it done in Germany. All your electric plugs will have to be changed to the German type—a simple household task that even you can perform.

Your washing machine should be the non-automatic type. Don't bother with a television set yet since (at this writing) television is just starting in Germany. Radios should be converted for best results, but they will operate through a locally procured transformer. Don't bother with electric clocks, since you can buy them on the local market geared for German current. Take your deep freeze if you have one, converted, of course.

The deep freeze is not a necessity. Shopping facilities, particularly for food-stuffs, are very good throughout Germany. You can buy all the standard American canned and packaged goods.

Much of the meat and most of the vegetables are from the local market, and of high quality. Butter, eggs and pasteurized milk are brought in from Denmark and Holland, and fresh citrus fruits are available all year round. And if the commissary doesn't please your palate, the local shops are well stocked and happy to serve Americans.

Which brings up money. You will use Military Payment Certificates for purchases on military installations, and Deutsche Marks on the local market. The Deutsche Mark is valued at about 24 cents. Commissaries operate on a credit system, with bills payable by the month. The word from Heidelberg is that at current prices the commissary bill for a family of two adults with a part-time maid should run about \$60 a month, while two adults, three children under 12 and a full-time maid should run up a bill of about \$125.00.

Post Exchange facilities, like the commissary, are excellent. All the normal things are available; but like PXs everywhere, the choice of clothing is pretty monotonous, and women's shoes that fit are hard to come by. They do, however, have an unusual service in the Sears, Roebuck and Montgomery Ward catalogues, and order blanks are available in the PXs. As in every other overseas station, it is wise to make an arrangement with the personal shopper in your favorite State-side department store for the purchase of things like shoes, children's dress clothes, and pretty dresses. Men's clothes, too, are a problem now that the wearing of civilian clothes off duty is authorized in Germany. The Post Exchanges have a fair assortment of sports clothes, but their suits are dull, and the German tailor who can cut a suit to the American taste is a rarity. If you can get to England or Austria, fine. If not, make a deal with a good U.S. tailor before leaving.

Like the tailors, the dressmakers in Germany have a heavy hand and a mind of their own. This is not one hundred per cent true, of course, and if you find a good seamstress you're in luck, but generally you will find unimaginative producers of bulky seams. It is too bad, too, because while German materials are still rather shoddy there are wonderful British, Swiss and Italian goods available that will give many womenfolk the urge to sew.

FOR recreation, Germany offers year-round opportunities for outdoor sports: skating and skiing (and bobsledding for the very brave) in the winter; swimming, riding and tennis, in the summer.

Berchtesgaden and Garmisch, year-round resorts famous throughout Europe, are in southern Bavaria.

Germany is a land of opportunity for the sportsman, the person interested in the arts, or for the sightseer. Hunting and fishing can be enjoyed throughout the country (although your firearms must be registered with the Provost Marshal, and you are required to have German hunting and fishing permits), and there is always music. Every community has its orchestra, large or small, and in Stuttgart the local opera company gives performances ten months of the year.

In music and the arts, Germany gives you an opportunity to participate as well as listen and look. Private tutors are available throughout the country, and in some of the larger cities, such as Frankfurt, the Army maintains art and music centers where you can study instruments, voice, music theory, painting, drawing, wood carving, sculpture, etc., for nominal fees.

EDUCATIONAL facilities are excellent. The schools are run by the Army, with teachers from the United States except in certain subjects such as German and music, where highly qualified local teachers are used. Each military post has schools from kindergarten through the ninth grade, and there are nine schools which go through high school. Four of these are so-called "dormitory schools," where students from outlying areas may attend high school on a boarding school basis. The fee of \$20.00 a month in these schools covers all living expenses, and weekend travel back and forth to home is free. In all schools the Army operates in Germany there is no tuition charge and books are free.

For college-age children the University of Maryland operates a two-year junior college at Munich, and dependents also are entitled to attend Maryland courses held on the various military posts, for which resident credit is given. Many students take advantage of the European universities.

You will need an automobile. Most people take one with them, but you can buy one in Germany, or order one delivered there through the Post Exchange.

If you elect to buy a car once you're there, you have a choice of a new American car, a used American car, or a European car. In American automobiles, it is cheaper to buy a new one there through the PX than it is to buy a new one in the States and ship it over, because you save state and federal taxes. Used cars (American) in Germany are



Germany—and all Europe this side of the Iron Curtain—offers many diversions. And not the least of them is sightseeing—even the horse wants to peek.

going at pretty fair prices: a two-door 1950 Ford in reasonably good condition currently brings about \$1150. Whatever you do, get a small car, and preferably one of the "big three" brands, since gasoline is expensive, there is frequently delay in getting any but the most common parts, and German roads (except the Autobahn) are narrow, winding and cluttered with kids, carts, geese and bikes.

Many people get interested in the European cars. They are built for the local roads, they are cheap to drive, and they are fun. But they are so small you wear them rather than drive them, and they don't offer the comfort of American automobiles. And they seem relatively expensive.

You will be required to have insurance on your automobile—the same \$5,000-\$10,000-\$5,000 that is required on most U.S. Army posts—and to register it locally. You are also "requested" to get a USAREUR driver's license.

You will need the car for many reasons. Housing is frequently widely scattered in Germany, so in some cases you may find yourself 20 miles from the commissary and PX. There are usually busses, but bus travel leaves much to be desired—with an armful of groceries. Also, in the cities, local public transportation is none too good and always crowded. Also there are the sightseeing trips you'll want to make.

ALONG with your car you will want a camera. Wherever you go you'll find scenes of such interest and beauty that

you will want to take your own pictures "for the record." If you have a camera, take it with you. You will suffer violent temptation to spend your money on a German camera, for the Germans make some of the finest cameras in the world. Don't resist too hard, either. Get expert advice if you feel you need it, but do take advantage of your location and buy a German camera at a bargain.

Your clothes should be the same as you would have for life in New Jersey, except that you won't need as much true summer clothing. It never stays very hot in Germany; the ladies will appreciate a light wrap most summer evenings. Living among the military folk is decidedly informal, but the women will want two or three simple evening and/or dinner dresses and now that mufti is allowed, the men can make good use of a dinner jacket.

For recreation you will need the same equipment you use in the United States—golf clubs, tennis rackets, favorite guns or fishing tackle according to your own interests. The PXs and German stores offer excellent skis, skates, sporting weapons, fishing tackle, etc. If you are an ardent hunter there is no reason to stock up on ammunition unless you are a handgun fan addicted to the heavy calibers, which ammunition is hard to come by in Germany.

One last tip about Germany: Learn the language if you can. It helps in dealing with your household help, making friends with the neighbors, seeing the country, and picking up bargains in the stores.



COPTER CAVALRY

MAJOR BERT DECKER

MAJOR BERT DECKER, U. S. Air Force, is on duty at Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe. He tells us that his interest in the potentialities of helicopters is of respectable lineage, going back to the days when anyone who talked "'coppers" was considered a little "tetched in the haid."

THE CO of the 5th Helicopter Cavalry Squadron faced his twenty-three pilots. His back was to a map thumbtacked to a piece of plywood leaning against a tree.

"Group has given us orders to hit an enemy infantry division advancing along

these two parallel valleys," he said, pointing to the map. "They are in truck convoy, moving fast, spaced rather closely—prime targets.

"Their objective is obviously the bridges at Keypoint where two valleys converge at the river. They most likely

The 5th 'Copter Cavalry Squadron dobbles an enemy truck convoy

will put paratroopers there any minute, but that's not our headache. Air-observation claims those convoys should be about at this point in this valley at 1420, one hour from now. That is where I want to hit them!"

He paused and wet his lips.

"When they reach this point," he continued, "we will be here in this small valley to their left, our right facing them." He pointed to the map. "We will be in single file, flying tandem, spaced at two hundred yards, flying in that direction [pointing] just the opposite to their direction. We will hug the top of that ridge, treetop level, and I mean treetop. Trim 'em!

"When Air-ob Four—he will be up on top—sees that our tail has cleared the van of that convoy in the next valley, he will give us **BY THE LEFT FLANK, FLY**. We will maintain radio silence but on his order we will all swing left, go up over that ridge abreast and down on them. Notice as we clear that ridge we will only have about 300 yards to go on that road. That will give you less than seven seconds before you are on them. Notice the ridge has only a few scattered trees according to these air photos. Go between 'em, not over 'em. Hug the ground, come in low. Got that?"

He glanced from face to face. They nodded their heads. Their faces were intent.

"Then get this: I will not be able to watch you and give commands. I'll be busy. As you come down on that road, swing right and run up it for a hundred or two hundred yards, pouring it to them. Watch the guy in front of you. Don't shoot him down. Then swing left and drop down behind this woods and tandem on me. We should be out of sight in three or four seconds. Do you see where I mean?"

"From there, follow me across the valley and up this deep ravine—keep low—up over into the second valley, right

here. As you see, this second valley is heavily wooded, but right along here the woods is cleared on both sides of the road at least a hundred yards for over five miles or so. It's a dream spot. They can't see us until we are on them. The road does wind, so watch it." He paused for breath.

"I will take us in parallel to the road," he continued, "coming back in this direction. When I give you **RIGHT OBLIQUE, FLY**, we swing in and hit them from the rear. Drop down over the treetops, swing low and left on the road and rake them for two to three hundred yards. Then up over the woods on their left and follow me home.

"Any questions?"

One pilot raised his hand.

"What is it?"

"Do we take napalm bombs or just strafe?"

"We just use our fifties, thirties, and rockets. No napalm. We travel light and fast. We're saving the napalm for tanks. Any other questions?"

"None? Good! Push your copters out from under the trees at exactly 1355. It is now 1330. Dismissed!"

AT 1355 hours the cavalry-pilots and their mechanics pushed the single-seater copters out into the clearing. They were odd-looking machines. Two single-bladed rotors which turned in opposite directions were pushed by two small, powerful engines slung right under the blades. Below the engines was the pilot. His cockpit was a powerful sphere of thick, clear, transparent plastic. Even the round hatchway door was transparent and maintained the perfect spherical lines of the cockpit. Below the cockpit sphere was a tricycle landing gear with a wide spread. Slung on the top of the landing gear, nestled up close to the sphere, were four caliber .50 and six caliber .30 machine guns. Just below the machine guns was a row of rockets. A

stubby tail stuck out in the back. There was no torque compensating rotor on it. Apparently the counter-rotating rotors took care of torque.

The CO appeared. The pilots began climbing into their machines. Quickly they strapped themselves in; practically only their legs and arms could move. The harness they buckled themselves into was padded with foam rubber, as were the seats and the seat backs. They even hooked their crash helmets to a wide rubber band. Their heads could move so far and no farther. A sudden crash would not snap and break their necks. Each man looked as though he were ready to go over Niagara in a barrel.

The engines started with quiet but powerful-sounding purrs. The copters took off fast, one after another, angled up over the woods and were gone, leaving the trees swaying from their backwash.

A few minutes later the squadron was purring straight up a broad, long valley in close vee formation. A wide river was a placid ribbon 300 feet below them.

The valley veered left but the CO led them straight on up over the ridge. They crossed several shallow valleys and approached a higher range of mountains. The CO signalled for single file and started up a shallow valley. They were low, hugging the forest, flying between the taller tree tops. An enemy squadron flying high over them never even spotted them. However, one jet broke off and started a dive on a lone observation plane.

A calm, concise voice spoke over the air.

"Air-ob Four to Fool One. You are about a mile from your planned departure point. I'm getting out of here!"

The 5th flew on unnoticed. Suddenly the CO signalled by swinging right and then sharply left. Each copter swung left with him. Abreast, the long line of copters skimmed up over the ridge and dipped down into the next valley.

MANY of the enemy never knew what hit them. The copters came in low and fast, some of them only four or five feet off the ground. Their machine guns pounded. They swung right at the road, smashing their slugs into the trucks and then hedge-hopped over them. One

—apparently an ammo truck—exploded violently, blowing a helicopter high into the air. A rotor flew from it in a high spinning arc.

"Fool Six to Fool One! Fool Five is rolling out!"

"Fool Six and Fool Seven cover him! Fool Eight get him!" the CO snapped as he slapped two rockets into a truck turning off the road to get out of his fire.

Fool Five was really rolling. When his rotor went, he yanked the old "Roll Stick" but fast. The landing gear with its machine guns plowed into the ditch, the engine with its one rotor and tail went whirling off at an angle; Fool Five was twisting slowly end over end wondering if the sphere's parachute would open. The sphere glanced off a tree trunk, bounded over a low stone wall at an angle, plunged through some bushes and finished up in a plowed field fifty yards from the road.

As the sphere rolled to a stop, Fool Eight was practically setting down on top of it, peering anxiously in at Fool Five. Fool Six and Fool Seven circled overhead watching the road.

Fool Five's grin was wobbly and he staggered as if drunk but he made it to Fool Eight. He flopped across the machine guns and hooked his harness to the safety snap. The three copters were flitting down over the hill zipping between the tree tops when the enemy fired his only shot in the action. It was wide. The copters were gone. They left eighty burning or wrecked trucks behind them.

"Fool Eight to Fool One. I have Fool Five. Fool Six and Seven are covering us."

"Good! Good! Take him home. Six and Seven too. They can never catch us. Good luck!"

"Roger and out!"

WHEN the squadron burst out of the narrow ravine into the second valley, the CO sensed something was wrong. He could see strips of the road through the trees but no trucks flashed along it. "They must have stopped," he thought and led the squadron back up towards the ridge, looking for a clearing.

The clearing he found was merely a hole in the forest, right on top of the ridge. As they landed, the CO ordered Flight Charley to be security guards. The four flyers pulled tommy guns from their racks and moved off into the forest in four different directions.

The CO didn't climb out of his copter. He was looking up at the tallest tree on the edge of the clearing.

"Hey, Joel!" he yelled. "Do you think

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you could get down off that if I put you up there?" he asked, still looking at the tree.

"Hell, yes," said Joe. He climbed onto the CO's landing gear and grinned at him through the plastic floor. A minute later Joe was in the top of the tree peering up-valley. When the CO landed he found all the pilots were just inside the perimeter of the clearing, peering into the deep woods. They were chattering about how many trucks they had clobbered in the first valley. The CO grinned a little tight smile of satisfaction. A tight vee of jets flashed overhead, low. Their wings swept back abruptly and bulged near the fuselage. Enemy! "Might be cover for that truck convoy!" thought the CO, lighting a cigarette.

Ten minutes later Joe called.

"Here they come, boss!"

"How far?"

"About five miles. They don't seem as bunched but they are coming fast." He was trying to time them with his watch.

"Never mind that, get down here. We will be able to hear their engines from here. Gather round, gang!" The CO was spreading his map on the ground.

"A little change of tactics," he said. "I got the lay of the land better as we came in. We'll pop back over the ridge here after we hear the first truck go by, sneak along the far side of the ridge until we find that ravine we originally came in, swing left in on them and hit them from the rear as we planned before. However, this is the change: Space at 300 yards, not 200. They are not as bunched and there will be less chance of you shooting the copter in front of you. Watch that! After making your run, swing right off the road over the trees and dip down in the valley to its bottom. There swing right and we'll tandem to their rear. Charley, you will be leading, and I want you practically wading in that creek. I'll be tail and

give the word on the radio when to flank right again. As we reach the road we should hit the second half of that convoy just stopping and bunched up. Empty your guns. Got it?"

They were all grins.

"OK. Flight Dee relieve the security guards so I can brief them. Come in when you hear the first truck motor."

IT happened just the way the CO had planned it. They clobbered the first half of the convoy, dipped down out of sight into the valley and swung to the rear to catch the second half of the convoy bunching as it stopped. The twenty of them came through without a scratch. The enemy jet cover flashed over them twice as they snaked through ravines but never saw them. It just about killed them when the CO made them maintain radio silence all the way home.

The Group Commander was delighted. "That should slow them down a couple of hours," he said to the 5th's CO. "If they try to push on tonight, hit them with napalm using your infra-red. We will have tanks at Keypoint before midnight. We already have a battalion here. Flew them in while you were gone, just in case. Personally, I hope they turn back. Our 6th Squadron has already mined the roads behind them. You know, those new fast-laying plastic jobs I told you about. That's going to be one sad division by morning either way. You certainly did your share."

IT took almost all of World War I to learn that planes could be used to attack the enemy. Planes were first used for observation only. Then a pilot observer got a bright idea. He tried to throw a brick through the propeller of an enemy's plane. The enemy got mad and started to shoot his pistol. Actually! Not being able to hit anything, the next day he brought a shotgun. That did some damage. The damaged lad was rather peeved. He was really burned when the enemy rigged up a machine gun that was synchronized to shoot through the propeller, and shot him down in flames. By the end of the war, dog-fighting was a gay, dangerous sport and when things were dull, the pilots took to shooting at people on the ground.

We are being just as slow to realize the military value of helicopters. Some day we will realize that they are the most versatile ground-support weapon we have. We might even be smart enough to realize that we should use them in mass concentration against the enemy when and where he least expects it.



This car owner, replacing his brake bands at the Fort Sill Automotive Safety Repair Shop, has plenty of first class help from Junior, who wields a mighty hammer (on his nose?), and from a trained mechanic on duty at the shop.



The mechanic supervises every step in the work of inexperienced car owners. Here one of them watches an owner placing new brake linings on the drums.

FIX-YOUR-CAR SHOP

In a barracks at Fort Sill one morning, Private First Class Jay Blank was bemoaning the terrible fate that had befallen him. The brakes on his car had gone bad and the \$12.82 in his pocket was all he had until next pay day—and he wouldn't, sad to say, have enough left out of his pay then to get a commercial brake job.

"Seems to me a guy smart enough to be a big shot typist ought to know that he can save himself a lot of money by doing the job himself over at the Post automobile repair shop," one of Blank's fellow PFCs observed.

"I'm no mechanic. I don't even oil my typewriter," Blank rejoined.

"You don't have to be a mechanic. They've got fellows over there that know more about cars than you do about your home town. They'll show you how and they won't let you make no mistakes, neither."

PFC Blank decided he would check into this. "After all," he thought, "if I don't get those brakes fixed they'll be taking up my post permit and I'll be on my uppers for sure."

That afternoon he drove around to the shop and found that it was true; he could fix his own brakes under the supervision of expert mechanics, and the only cost would be for materials.

In the days that followed, Blank found the shop was equipped with modern tools and equipment where soldier car owners could learn shop safety, shop practices, care and use of tools, lubrication methods, maintenance procedures, engine tear-down and assembly, and brake relining and adjustment. Blank became a regular "customer" of the shop. It saved him money and gave him an interesting hobby.

What does this mean to commanders?

First, higher standards of safety (with the result of fewer accidents). Thanks to the repair shop, Blank's car can pass the post inspection.

Second, higher troop morale. The hobby occupies Blank's spare time productively.

Third, better military vehicle maintenance. What PFC Blank learned about the maintenance of motor vehicles gave him a skill the Army could use. Commanders who visit the shop find men who are interested in motors; men who have developed a sound maintenance background. These men are selected for specialist training in motors.

The top command of The Artillery School recognizes the potentialities of the Auto Repair Shop and encourages its use. Requests for operational details of the Shop are frequently received at The Artillery School, as news of its value and its success has reached major installation commanders throughout the country. Such requests are encouraged and should be addressed to the Director, Department of Motors, The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla. It should be added that the Shop is a project in the Army's Crafts Program sponsored by the Adjutant General's Office.

LT. COL. JOSEPH SAFER



This soldier-hobbyist is using the shop's modern equipment to clean his car's spark plugs. The shop's hours are geared to soldiers' off-duty time. Except for Monday when it is closed all day, the shop is open from 1300 to 2030 hours from Tuesday to Friday, and from 0900 to 1930 on Saturday, Sunday and holidays.



A motor tune-up, performed under the supervision of trained mechanics and using modern equipment, teaches car owners the value of good maintenance. The shop rules are posted on the wall.



THE RIFLE SQUAD KEY TO MOVEMENT

CAPTAIN THOMAS A. WARE, JR.

THE formula for success in battle is $F + M = S$. Spelled out it is Fire Superiority plus Decisive Movement equals Success. The manuals call it fire and movement. Without fire superiority, movement in the face of determined resistance is suicide. Fire superiority does not capture objectives unless complemented by decisive movement. One is completely dependent upon the other.

Our Army accepts and teaches this principle. And tactical failures in battle can usually be traced to improper execution of F or M, sometimes both.

Since World War II the firepower of our infantry division has been powerfully increased. By adopting the six-gun battery our artillery is at least fifty per cent more powerful; there are now three times as many machine guns in the rifle company as before; the addition of recoilless rifles has greatly increased the firepower of the infantry battalion. Nev-

ertheless, there are still soft spots. All available weapons are not always used: the quad .50s and the twin 40s of the AAA (AW) Battalion, or the heavy weapons of the reserve battalion. More often faulty fire comes from failure to use the right weapons on the right targets at the right time. We do not get the full benefit of our tremendous number of weapons. Fire, however, can be and is being constantly improved through proper training, planning and practice.

Officers of other armies say we are stronger on the F than we are on the M. However, the emphasis on fire has caused our movement to suffer. To get maximum results with minimum cost, a relative balance must be maintained between F and M. We do not have that balance and the gap is getting wider. To restore the balance we shouldn't cut down on our firepower but we should increase our movement. As the number and power of weapons are increased, movement becomes much more difficult.

Our problem is to find out what will make our men move and shoot. Several methods have been put into practice.



CAPTAIN THOMAS A. WARE, JR., Infantry, is a 1948 graduate of the Military Academy. He entered the Army as an enlisted man in 1943.

Inducements were offered to make the infantry more attractive and appreciated, such as combat pay and badges and special markings for the uniform. The value, necessity and ugly glory of the foot soldier has been fairly sold to the public. Those are all steps much deserved and not to be discarded, but will they, when the chips are down, make a man fight? I don't think so.

What does a man fight for? His country? His division? His regimental commander? Only partly. If he fights it is for pride in himself and for his buddies in the company and squad. He doesn't want to let them down or to lose face or

break faith. He moves or doesn't move according to his state of mind, training, discipline and control. He must have a feeling of belonging and have faith in his weapons, companions and leaders. These things we now know. Any attempt to increase our movement against fire must take these facts into account. There is no catch-all solution but there must be, and are, down-to-earth steps in the right direction.

THE rifle squad is our basic unit or foundation, and here is where movement originates. Regiments are stopped because squads are "pinned" down. General J. Lawton Collins has often said that good squads make good platoons and eventually good divisions. If we are to narrow the gap between F and M, here is where we must start, for the rifle squad is the key to movement.

Within the past fifteen years the organization of our rifle squad has twice been changed radically. In our square divisions we had the eight-man squad headed by a corporal. When the divisions were triangularized our squads were modernized also. During World War II we had the twelve-man squad with its Able (scout), Baker (AR), and Charlie (riflemen) teams. It was found that one man could not adequately control eleven others in dispersed, flat-on-the-belly warfare, hence our postwar nine-man squad. Eight men are still too many to get up and move without exposing the leader. If we are to give the needed impetus to M, the squad is due for another change.

The rifle squad should have eleven men, broken down into squad leader, assistant squad leader, and three fire teams of three men each. Each fire team should be armed with a BAR, until a suitable lighter weapon is issued. What advantages would this squad have over the present-day one?

Morale, a product of team spirit, would be enhanced. Marines have a thirteen-man squad which they like very much. It is composed of a squad leader and three fire teams of four men each with one AR per team. General Marshall also found that weapons crews gave a far better account of themselves than did individual riflemen. Why? Again because of the team and because they knew they had a weapon that would

really hurt the enemy. It is possible to make every rifleman an organic part of a tightly-knit weapons team. It should be done.

Discipline is the heart and soul of any army. Movement increases or decreases in direct ratio to the state of discipline. Discipline can make men perform their duty when their desire to survive rebels. Discipline, which was not perfect in World War II, took a sharp plunge after VJ Day. When discipline goes, so eventually do morale and efficiency. No doubt the Army had to accept the criticisms of a grateful nation (via Congress) and the provisions of the Doolittle Board to save its very existence. The low point was reached when soldiers were pampered and coddled, and made unhappier as a consequence. That point has passed, but the damage has not yet been fully rectified. The well-meaning career plan also played its part when in 1949-50 there was a flood of automatic promotions. Most platoons had more corporals than privates. There was an overall stepdown of pride and respect for stripes, authority and discipline. How could a man expect to act like a noncommissioned officer when he did the work of and was treated like a private? The complaint is often heard that we have no good junior noncoms to run our squads. Small wonder! Our present TO lists one sergeant first class, one sergeant, and five corporals out of nine men! Keep the squad leader as a SFC and his assistant as sergeant, but reduce the corporals to three. Each team leader will be a corporal. He will be held responsible for his two men and all weapons. Authority any responsibility either bring out a spark in a man or show his weaknesses. What better training could you have for future squad leaders and assistants? We'll have better noncoms if we treat them as noncoms.

Control became more difficult as the power of weapons increased. With smaller teams the squad leader, instead of having to push or pull eight individuals, can work through his team leaders and assistant squad leader. Many times initiative comes with responsibility. The team leader has only to say to the men on either side of him "Let's go." Visualize the vast improvement that would result when the squad was forced to advance by fire and movement. The squad leader and his assistant will be where they can



best see and control the teams. Instead of shouting out numbers or names it would only be necessary to yell Able, Baker, or Charlie. Two teams covering and one moving. If, however, only one man in a team responded (not always the leader), the others would usually go, too. They couldn't let him down. Atomic warfare will require even greater dispersion than we now practice. Control must be decentralized or lost, and with it movement.

FLEXIBILITY is a must in all military units. General Collins stressed the fundamental purpose, need, and tactical use of our triangular concept. Flexibility is a cornerstone. Let's carry this concept through down to our basic unit, the squad. The three similar interchangeable units would be the fire teams. Seldom in training, and rarely in combat, will a squad be at full strength. This situation puts the acid test to the flexibility of any unit. A team would still be a team with only the leader and the AR gunner. Even if a squad were reduced to five men it should still be effective with a leader and two AR teams. If the platoon were so reduced as to require cutting down to two rifle squads, the platoon leader should assign the remnants of his smallest squad (two to four men) to another as a team and not as individuals (keep that team feeling).

Flexibility would help us man outposts and form patrols. We know now that to send one man is useless, so the buddy system was started. Two are sent at the minimum. If the job is worth doing, such as listening post or interior or contact patrols, it is worth doing right. Why not send a team? It would be far more effective than several individuals. It has a leader, automatic firepower, and each man has a sense of responsibility for the others. As for reconnaissance and combat patrols, they could be made any desired size from one team up. A team or teams could be temporarily attached to another squad if the mission called for it.

IT is obvious that such a rifle squad would call for some changes in our tactics (not fundamentals) and formations. However, the addition of a second AR to the rifle squad has already made our squad tactics and formations somewhat obsolescent.

In the attack the squad leader could have his assistant cover his advance with one or two teams, while he maneuvered with one or two teams (again flexible). Fire and movement would be by team rushes. Of course, the squad as a unit will continue to cross the LD and ad-

vance, as far as possible, under the protection of heavier supporting fires.

In the defense each fire team would be an individual strong point within the squad strong point. No outpost or position would be of less than team strength.

Several possible formations will be given to show the many possibilities:

Squad in column or as a point.

Many fire fights are won or lost in the first minutes. Who "pins" whom down first? The scout element is a full team with its own AR. The squad leader and his assistant have teams they can control easily. Thus any surprise fire can be quickly countered by the leaders of the squad.

Squad as skirmishers. During the first phase of the assault fire the AR men would be about one pace in front of the line so as to have clear fields of fire. The others would move on line with them for the final stage. Team leaders keep visual contact with squad leader and assistant.

The squad diamond. The old standby, the squad diamond, would not be changed much and it keeps the teams intact. It also permits automatic fire in any direction quickly.

Defense. The two-man foxhole is now a must. We have found, especially at night, that a man will fight much better if he has someone to share his fear. The fire team would permit shoulder-to-shoulder contact, a powerful tonic against loneliness and fear. Each team would become a strong point.

Since men seem to fight better as weapons crews, let's dig them in in that way. Besides preserving the team spirit, and providing all-around defense this would permit a three-relief, around-the-clock guard. Naturally it is more vulnerable to enemy fire and tanks than a one- or two-man foxhole but no more so than a horseshoe emplacement. It more than compensates for its size by its ability to be a strong point.

Training. The fire teams must live, work, play and train together until they are a team in fact and not just in name.

Every man in the rifle squad will have to be as well-trained with the automatic rifle as he is with his M1 rifle. He must be able to take care of it. Each soldier must fire the AR, as well as the M1, for qualification. The best men can be selected as the gunners, and a ready pool of trained replacements is available as proof against constant turnover in training or battle. Grenades, rifles and the AR are the tools of the fire team's trade. Field problems must start at the team level to develop skill, confidence, initiative and, above all, spirit of teamwork.

THESE then are the basic advantages and employment of the squad. Perhaps you can think of many more. There are some disadvantages. It will require eighteen more men per rifle company, 162 per regiment, and 486 per infantry division. If worse comes to worst it would be far better to have thirty-six divisions that would carry their full weight than thirty-seven so-so ones.

Three ARs per squad will shoot up too much ammunition. Perhaps, but that is what they said before the Garand replaced the Springfield. If the program now in effect to lighten the weight of the soldier's equipment is successful, the ammunition will get there. From the studies made so far, though, it seems that the main problem is to get people to fire the ammo they have at the right time. The added weight of the AR is not gleefully accepted during maneuvers, but in combat its firepower makes it a welcomed friend. The Belgian FN automatic rifle may, before too long, replace the M1 rifle, the carbine, the AR and possibly the light machine gun. In that event the proposed principles and team organization would still be applicable. Perhaps every third FN could have a light, folding bipod attached near the muzzle to give that extra stability, accuracy and added range so desirable in the present AR.

A reorganization of the rifle squad into three fire teams has many advantages over the present squad. It should help increase the ratio of fighters to non-fighters.

The formula $F + M = S$ will work if we bring our movement up to par with our fire. The key to M is the rifle squad.

Since this article was written, an eleven-man rifle squad with two ARs was tested at Fort Campbell. Reports suggest that the results were good. However, it is doubtful if the change will be made, due to the manpower requirements and the effort to decrease the size of the infantry division. To my mind, the principles stated above could still be applied even in our present nine-man (two AR) squad, in one of two ways: (1) Form three teams of three men each (add one AR) with squad leader, assistant squad leader and senior corporal as team leaders. (2) form two permanent fire teams in the squad and train that way; Team Able with men Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8 under the squad leader, and Team Baker with men 3, 5 and 7 under the assistant squad leader (a corporal in each team to be assistant team leader). Test these two methods extensively, side by side, and pick the best.

CEREBRATIONS

Abolish Propaganda

Doctrinally our Psy War people say that *propaganda* is a perfectly legitimate word, derived from the Latin *propagare* (to peg, to set down, to spread) and that they will continue to use it to designate certain of their activities. But when, in lectures, I make an objective presentation of the Psy War definition and doctrine, I get some might fishy looks.

The purity of the origin of the word *propaganda* may be unquestioned. But it has a sickly complexion that frightens otherwise brave men. Goebbels and the Soviet Agitprop have made millions think of the word as something leprous, and they shun it.

Usage, we all know, determines the connotation of a word, and eventually fixes its dictionary meaning. And the hard fact today is that most people today draw a distinction between the words *truth* and *propaganda*.

In the light of its generally ill-favored connotation, why do we bullheadedly persist in using *propaganda* for our legitimate activities? It only hurts us. One of Psy War's outfits is called the Consolidation Propaganda Company. What a mouthful to hang on an outfit! The purpose of the Consolidation Propaganda Company is to move in with Civil Affairs or Military Government and assist in the control of communications; radio, press and the like. Imagine the reaction of the peoples in future liberated or occupied areas to that unpsychologically selected title! The *propaganda* in it is going to make it very difficult to consolidate anything.

Why not call it something simple and innocuous? Civil Communications Company would be good, for it has the virtue of being alliterative and the innocent might even think it polite.

We Americans have learned to call undertakers *morticians*, and door-to-door book salesmen *educational advisors*, so we should have little trouble being equally euphemistic and calling propaganda *information*.

MAJOR DANIEL J. KERN, USAR

Let's March Again

We have been hearing for years about armies which have something ours doesn't. In World War II we heard about Japanese soldiers who marched phenomenal (by our standards) distances

through the jungle. We heard about the Russian soldiers who bested the Germans partly because they were tougher, could march, could stand a little more cold, could live out in the forests, could move into position on foot, and could fight with a little simpler and a little less equipment than our soldiers did; we still hear about them—the same things, how many of them there are, and that they are receiving improved equipment. From Korea we heard about Chinese Communist troops who marched farther than ours: can, who climbed the mountains more easily than our troops, and who marched by night.

We have known all along that our soldiers can't march. The evidence of our admission is in our Tables of Equipment and in our tactics. The number of trucks in the TO&E, the number of bulldozers in the engineer battalions, and our reluctance to advance in a campaign until we provide for getting the roads through are all partial results of our admission. We rationalize this deficiency by explaining to ourselves that our way of life doesn't prepare Americans to march. Chinese have been walking all of their lives and our men have been riding. And it's true. Our men have been riding instead of walking both before and after they entered the Army. And before and after they entered battle.

Saint Barbara

EVERY so often one of our artillery members asks us for biographical material and a picture of Saint Barbara, the patron saint of artillerymen. We've always been happy to respond to these requests but they are coming so frequently that we dug into the old files and worked up the best biographical material we could find, had it mimeographed and are now prepared to make it available at no cost to you who want it. We sent our picture of Saint Barbara to a photographer who made us up a stock of prints in two sizes: 11 X 14 and 8 X 10. If you want a picture for framing you should ask for a "mat print" and if you want the picture for reproduction purposes ask for a "glossy print." The prices are quite modest, \$3.00 for the 11 X 14-inch size and \$2.50 for the 8 X 10-inch size.

We think that it hasn't hurt us to be realistic about this difference in a basic soldier capability. But it has hurt. And it's wrong. We need the spirit of the street urchin heard announcing to his gang that he could "spit further, jump higher, squat lower, run faster," than any kid in town.

Let's look more closely at this one point—marching. Is it really necessary to admit that U.S. soldiers can't march as well as Chinese Communists? What is basic about marching? It seems to be a matter of endurance and training. Normally, the stronger, healthier man will, with all other things equal, have more endurance. Are Americans, man for man, weaker and less healthy than Chinese? We know that isn't true. But the Chinese always walked and are accustomed to it. That's where training can even us up. If we set out-marching any army in the world as a training objective and allot the time necessary to it, we Americans will be able to out-march any army because we start with better health and greater strength.

But such a training program would be at the expense of other activities. Is it necessary and is it worth the cost? We know we have this deficiency but we've always had firepower to tip the scales. We hope we always will have firepower on our side. But we can't be sure; the enemy is no dumbbell when it comes to research and development. So we had better try to be his physical equal.

It looks as if we have at least two good reasons for re-establishing a marching tradition in the U. S. Army: (1) we may fight future wars without the expected compensating advantage of firepower and (2) it will restore confidence and self-respect to U. S. soldiers.

Let's get at it. Let's start marching.

LT. COL. JAMES R. KENT

The Rifle Squad

What is this talk that is going around about increasing the size of the rifle squad to eleven or twelve men? I'd like to speak up against it.

My concept of the rifle squad and how it should operate bears heavily, of course, on why I'm opposed to increasing its size.

¶ The rifle squad should be the smallest maneuver unit in the infantry organizational setup. As such it should be, in a manner of speaking, indivisibly small;

that is, it should remain an entity during operations and not be split into two or more parts for circuitous type maneuver.

¶ It should be simply armed. The habit of girding the squad with more sinew than it can regularly and efficiently use must be guarded against. As soon as we settle on either the T44 or the FN rifle, it should become the principal weapon for every member of the squad.

¶ The squad leader, with rare exception, should be able to control directly everyone in his squad. He should not have to exercise control through an assistant.

In short, if we do not have a squad that remains an entity during operations,

if we do not have a squad that is simply armed, and if we do not have a squad whose members can be personally controlled by its leader, then I maintain that we do not have a squad at all. We have a section!

Advocates of a larger squad contend that the increase in size will provide a cushion against casualties making the squad ineffective early in battle. The answer to this is that an oversize, unwieldy squad will be far more vulnerable to casualties than a well-knit, tightly controlled one.

I should like to go back to my third point and expand on it. If we accept the principle that the squad leader should

be able to control directly everyone in his squad, then we are asking too much of one man when we ask him to exercise direct control over ten or eleven other men on the field of battle under conditions of maximum danger, fatigue and confusion. We are stretching his span of control beyond the breaking point. Actually, we are imposing upon him a wider span of control than upon any other infantry leader in the chain of command!

And who is this man from whom we demand more, proportionately speaking, than we do from any other infantry leader? He is our lowest-ranking infantry leader. As such, he has doubtless had the least amount of leadership experience.

In an address at Cleveland last November, General Ridgway stated that "a soldier of average or above average intelligence should complete no less than 128 weeks—two and one-quarter years—of training before he is properly trained to perform the duties of an infantry squad leader, before he should be entrusted with the lives of others in battle." Yet, under conditions of large-scale or total mobilization when our army, as always, will have to sprout like Jack's beanstalk, this rifle squad leader may very well have to be a lad with only a few months of training.

Are we not, therefore, being inconsistent in our approach if we raise the standard required of our future squad leader, when we know that in all probability we will be unable to give him all the time he should have to prepare him for his responsibilities?

In the same address, General Ridgway pointed out that one of the most significant tactical developments has been the consistently greater dispersion of troops on the battlefield, and with it a steady decentralization of the responsibility for tactical decisions.

How, in the face of this development—the consistently greater dispersion of troops on the battlefield—can an increase in the size of the rifle squad be justified? The control problem of the squad leader will be magnified not alone by the increase in the size of the squad but by the greater dispersion of the soldiers within the squad.

As a matter of fact, I'd much prefer to see the rifle squad decreased to something like seven men!

LT. COL. GEORGE JUSKALIAN

How to Write a Staff Study

First, state your conclusions. That's not the way the manual tells you to

Double Exposure Locates Enemy Artillery Positions

The use of photography in combat had some interesting developments in Korea, one of the most useful of which was the technique of photographing occupied enemy artillery positions.

This technique involved nighttime exposure on film which had previously been exposed during daylight. This double exposure made it possible to identify active enemy artillery positions. It worked like this.

An OP would be selected from which active enemy artillery fire could be expected to be observed. The azimuth to the center of the area under observation of the OP would be determined and the photographer would be instructed to lay his camera on this azimuth. The camera would be solidly mounted on sandbags and the azimuth would be checked on the ground-glass focusing screen of the camera. Then the daylight exposure would be made using one-half stop under a normal exposure on regular high-speed panchromatic film such as Super XX.

The camera would be left in its fixed position until nightfall. During the darkness the shutter would be opened for an hour, to approximately f5.6 to take advantage of night illumination.

When developed, the film shows pinpoint flashes superimposed on the daylight photo. These flashes were from the fire of enemy artillery.

From the OP the film would be sent to the laboratory for developing and printing, a process that can take as little as forty minutes after its arrival at the lab. The prints are then sent to the corps artillery S2 for evaluation.

The problem is to match the photo to the counterbattery map. Since the coordinates the OP are known and the coordinates of distant points on the photo can be determined, a series of directional rays are drawn on the photo. Inspection will usually give the location once the azimuth is known. A higher degree of accuracy may be obtained by taking two photographs from the OP. A location is determined by plotting the intersecting rays on the counterbattery map.

Usually the photography confirms that a previously suspected position is indeed occupied by the enemy. However, when flashes on the prints are from an unsuspected location, it is wise to verify the occupancy of the position by other methods.

It is not difficult to learn to tell the difference between the flashes made by enemy artillery and the flashes made by outgoing friendly fire. When friendly artillery exploding on the target is photographed it makes larger and more irregular light spots on the film than the flashes made by enemy artillery fire as it leaves the piece.

The camera used in these operations in Korea was the standard PH-47 Speed Graphic with either Super XX or Superpan Press film. The issue tripod was not used because it is too light. However, the "combat tripod" consisting of a heavy-duty pan-tilt head, and short "machine gun" tripod legs can be solidly locked in position. It was found that the five-inch focal length on the PH-47 camera was not ideal for this work. However, an accessory lens with a 10-inch focal length and an aperture of f1:4.85 is available in the PH-277.

Army Field Forces has encouraged this method of identifying enemy artillery positions and recommends further exploitation and development of it. It believes that it would be of value in a war of movement as well as in conditions such as existed in Korea.

begin a staff study, but that's the way it's done. If you know what you want to prove, proving it is easy. Let's take as an easy example that you want to prove that carbines should be equipped with tripods. (Never mind your preconceived ideas, just say the old man wants it that way.)

From your conclusion evolve an appropriate statement of the problem. An eye-catching generality is best: Should certain small arms be equipped with detachable mounts (bipods, tripods, quadrupods) so as to improve accuracy of fire and provide maximum effectiveness?

Now make your assumptions. These are important. Make one assumption supporting your conclusion: The inaccuracy and ineffectiveness of certain small arms (e.g. the carbine) makes it absolutely necessary that some type of support or steadying device be provided for its use. And make another assumption precluding any other conclusion except the one you wish to prove: The all-steel, collapsible, expandable, non-expendable, completely interchangeable, three-armed weapon mount (hereinafter known as the carbine tripod) is the only existing or possible device suitable for attachment to and support of the carbine. (This is much like the old syllogism method whereby you can absolutely prove anything: Soldiers are brave; "Bug-Out Benny" is a soldier; therefore, "Bug-Out Benny" is brave.)

You'll want a few facts bearing on the problem. Here again, unsupportable and un-disprovable generalities will stand you in good stead. Besides, you don't have to dig for them; you can dream them up. For example: It is known that very few soldiers can fire the carbine with any great degree of accuracy beyond five hundred yards; headquarters troops and other rear echelon personnel usually equipped with carbines are notorious for their ineptness in the handling of unmounted small arms; such troops, so equipped, constitute a real threat to combat troops in rest areas; etc. You get the idea.

As for the discussion, you needn't be too concerned. A passage from Von Clausewitz or Victor Hugo will do. No one ever reads the discussion anyway. If you make the quote from a field manual, and it happens to be discovered, it'll appear original. Few ever read them.

Make your recommendations strong: In view of the above, it is deemed absolutely necessary that certain small arms be equipped with the all-steel, collapsible, expandable, non-expendable, completely interchangeable, three-armed weapon mount heretofore known as the

carbine tripod. One recommendation should reflect back to the statement of the problem: Such mounts would greatly improve accuracy of fire and provide for maximum effectiveness in the use of such arms, especially the carbine. Add a third for urgency: These tripods should be procured immediately (from Mighty Mount Company, the sole manufacturers) and stocked for immediate issue.


Before you submit your staff study you'll want to give it bulk and show you've thoroughly explored the problem. Attach a few copies of the old classified troop programs, mimeographed SOPs, a few overlays, a dog-eared issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, and mark them

with appropriate red, green, and yellow tabs.

That's about all there is to it. If you want to see how easy it is, try one of these: Should infantry be equipped with red bow-ties? Should merchant seamen receive combat pay? Should tanks be mounted on pneumatic tires? All absolutely provable.

This is what is known as completed staff work. Good or bad, you'll probably never hear of any tangible results from your carefully developed staff study. But what the hell? It pleases the old man, and that's what you were after to begin with.

SUSFUSO



Two-Reel Wire Cart

An infantry outfit in Germany has resurrected the long obsolete reel cart for laying wire. The cart was designed to make it possible to maintain continuous communication with a company CP during an attack. In field operations it is possible to lay one or two lines of wire at a rate of two and one-half miles an hour.

The cart has two 15-inch bicycle wheels mounted to a frame consisting of trips of metal welded together. The stationary axle is welded to the frame. Two pipes fit snugly over the axle but free enough to turn easily when the cart is in operation. The pipes are small enough in diameter to permit Reel DR-4 to fit over them. When two reels are used a 3/4-inch metal washer is placed between them and

each reel turns in an opposite direction. It has a detachable handle which makes it a compact load in the back of a jeep or trailer. The handles in the rear are handy for lifting the cart over obstacles (see cut).

The three-man crew keeps in continuous contact with the CP by means of a circuit established through two contact plates or discs fitted to the axle. Two brushes, similar to those on generators, are fastened to these discs, and wires from the brushes are connected to a telephone EE-8 or to the test clips of telephone TS-1.

The cart can be used to lay two lines in any direction if it is in a stationary position. If it is moved it can, of course, lay two lines in the same direction. It can also be used to lay a new line and pick up an unserviceable one in the same operation.

To get supporting fires for combat patrols use **THE GEORGE METHOD**

Captain Edward H. Pykosz

AS a result of many night combat patrols in Korea, the George Method of securing supporting fires was developed. It assures that the exact location of the patrol is known at all times and makes it possible to get full use of the company's 60mm mortars, attached machine guns, and even recoilless rifles. The patrol leader at the time of enemy contact is free to command and control his men, knowing that his company commander will give him supporting fires when and where he needs them. The George Method is so simple that all members of the patrol have confidence in it.

The George Method requires the preparation of an overlay of the patrol route. This involves a daylight reconnaissance by the patrol leader, assistant patrol leader, squad leaders, SCR 10 radio operator and the WEE 8 operator. At this time, the azimuth from the line of departure to the patrol objective is taken. Also noted along the patrol route are landmarks which will be distinguishable at night: lone trees, roads and cross roads, destroyed tanks or vehicles, and other distinctive features.

When the patrol leader returns to his CP after the visual reconnaissance, he starts building the George Method. He plots the distinguishable landmarks on an overlay of the patrol area and compares them with a map of the area (see cut). He then plots the route of the patrol, checking it against the landmarks already marked in.

Next he draws in the phase lines. He starts from the line of departure and numbers them toward the patrol objective, running the lines through easily distinguishable features. Phase lines may be given the name of a state or the home town of a patrol member. Do not use the name of more than one state or town for that may lead to confusion. From the line of departure, forward phase lines might be called: Michigan 1, Michigan 2, Michigan 3 and Michigan 4.

Then he puts in the zone lines, extending them well beyond the patrol objective. He centers one zone on the route of the patrol to insure safety from supporting fires. To avoid confusion he letters the zones from left to right.

This procedure requires the plotting of phase lines and zones before each patrol when you are on the offensive. However, in a defensive operation the plotting can be done immediately on arrival in that sector. The only changes that have to be plotted thereafter are the different patrol routes used on each occasion.

THE George Method is effective only if those who control the supporting fires participate in the planning. They are briefed and given copies of the overlay of the patrol route. Included in the briefing


are the Artillery FO, CO of the fire-support tanks, and HMG platoon leaders, the 4.2-inch mortar FO, the 81mm mortar FO, all company officers and possibly the S3 or assistant S3 of battalion.

Overlays or maps by themselves will not keep a patrol from becoming lost or unsure of its exact whereabouts. One check on its position is made from the WEE 8 wire rolls. Using only new, full rolls, when a roll is paid out the exact distance covered is known in yards.

Azimuth shot to the objective or back azimuth shot to a distinguishable feature at the line of departure will help to pinpoint the patrol location. The passing of each phase line marked by a feature that can be identified at night gives periodic checks on the patrol's location.

When it will not disclose the patrol, the exact location is communicated back to the company so that support crews will be prepared if a request comes in.

If enemy contact of superior strength is made, the patrol should attempt to disengage before the entire platoon is involved in the fight. At this time the exact location of the patrol should be relayed back in order to get suitable supporting fires where needed.



CAPTAIN EDWARD H. PYKOSZ, Infantry, now on duty at Fort Riley, Kansas, served in Korea with George Company, 23d Infantry, 2d Division, which developed the method described here and gave it its name.

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

No. 8 *Transfer or Detail?*

WHEN an officer decides the grass is greener on the other side of the fence and requests a transfer or detail to another arm or service, one question that must be answered is: "Will the proposed change be in the best interest of the service?" This article outlines some of the considerations and processing actions involved in arriving at a final decision.

Before making an official request each officer should clearly understand some of the differences between a transfer and a detail. A transfer, if approved, will permanently remove him from the assignment jurisdiction of his basic branch. He must be fully qualified to perform duty in the new branch, for it thereafter will monitor his career and determine his duty assignments. Reserve officers on extended active duty may apply for transfer if they are performing in the branch to which transfer is desired or if cogent reasons exist for transfer to a branch in which they are fully qualified to perform duty. There are no provisions for transfer of National Guard officers while on active duty. However, if otherwise qualified, they may apply for detail. Regular Army officers are not authorized to request a transfer to another branch until they have served at least two years in their basic branch after appointment in the Regular Army, except when the Department of the Army finds it necessary to build up a specific branch. Although technically qualified for duty with another branch, an officer who has spent considerable time in his basic branch should apply for transfer only after careful consideration of all factors. There is some danger that he might become "neither fish nor fowl."

A detail is a temporary shift to another arm or service in order to meet the needs of a specific branch. It does not effect a permanent change in basic branch. A detail may be considered comparable to an apprenticeship and normally should not be extended beyond

three years. Officers who remain in a detail status for longer periods lose opportunities to increase their basic branch capacities. They are depriving themselves of basic branch practice and theory as well as basic branch schooling. In time they should request return to their basic branch or transfer to the branch to which detailed.

OFFICERS must have good reasons for wanting a transfer and these must be clearly stated in their application which is submitted through channels. Indorsing commanders indicate their reaction to the request and if the request is not favorably considered they must state reasons therefor. Applications received from officers alerted or on orders for oversea assignment are returned without action. The application may be re-submitted from the oversea destination.

Details for Army Security and Military Intelligence officers may be considered as "carrier" branch details because Army Security and Military Intelligence are components of the Army Reserve only, and are not basic branches of the Regular Army. Therefore, Army Security and Military Intelligence officers who are ordered to active duty are detailed in a basic Army branch appropriate to their qualifications. The Intelligence and Security Branch, Career Management Division, monitors their careers and determines duty assignments. Army Security and Military Intelligence ROTC graduates on active duty are normally detailed to the branch of service in which they received ROTC training. Officers on active duty who are approved for transfer to Army Security or Military Intelligence normally are detailed in their former basic branch.

When applications for transfer or detail are received in Career Management Division, they are referred to the applicant's basic career management branch. In the basic branch the entire record is

reviewed and the application is forwarded with recommendation to the career management branch to which the officer is requesting transfer or detail. If the losing and gaining career management branches approve the requested change, orders are issued. In the event of disagreement, applications are referred to the Chief of CMD, for final determination.

Here are examples of the preceding actions: Captain Jones requests transfer from Artillery to Armor; if both branches approve the request, orders are published announcing the transfer. Captain Smith requests transfer from Infantry to Signal Corps; Infantry branch disapproves and Signal Corps approves; Captain Smith's application is referred to Chief, CMD, where the entire file of Captain Smith is reviewed and analyzed before a final decision is made.

AT times the Department of the Army encourages submission of requests for transfer or detail to branches that are short of officers. These announcements normally are published in D/A Circulars and include the grade, MOS, qualifying schooling, or other factors which potentially qualify the applicant. Department of the Army Circular 58, 20 July 1953, encourages qualified officers to submit requests for transfer or detail to Artillery, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance Corps, Judge Advocate General's Corps and Medical Service Corps. Normally, an officer is not transferred from one branch to another without his consent; however, involuntary transfer may be made if the Secretary of the Army rules it is in the interests of the service.

The decision to request a transfer or detail to another branch rests upon each officer. If he is firmly convinced that his transfer or detail would be in the best interest of the service, he should submit a request.

NEXT: Reserve component duty.

The Word from the Schools

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Advanced Course Has War Game

A three and one-half week war game—"The Life Cycle of an Infantry Regiment"—is now included in the Infantry Officers' Advanced Course. This exercise becomes the second part of the six-month-long course.

In the first part (approximately 21 weeks) the student is taught fundamentals and the principles and techniques needed to prepare him for the duties and responsibilities of an infantry field grade officer. In the past this was the only instruction given to prepare officers for field grade positions in the infantry regiment.

But now the second part of the course gives the student an opportunity to apply these principles and techniques. A series of related exercises requires him to solve "requirements" corresponding to those experienced in a field grade assignment. Students actually perform as regimental command and staff groups or as individual commanders, with minimum guidance from TIS faculty.

The war game is divided into a sequence of seven phases—each incident to the stages of an infantry regiment's life cycle. These are the phases:

- ☐ Activation of a regiment
- ☐ Training of a regiment
- ☐ Preparation and overseas movement of a regiment
- ☐ Overseas staging of a regiment
- ☐ Regiment in combat
- ☐ Regiment in occupation duty
- ☐ Movement to Zone of Interior and inactivation of a regiment.

Small-Unit Studies

The infantry squad and the effectiveness of small infantry units are being studied at The Infantry School by the Psychological Research Associates. Sponsored by the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University, the unit is studying the squad during daylight operations to determine the number of men and the necessary equipment needed for an effective squad.

The other project being conducted by the Research Associates is to determine the effectiveness of small infantry units during a night patrol. It is being sponsored by the Personnel Research Branch of the Adjutant General's Office.

Instructors' Conference

TIS will hold its annual Infantry Instructors' Conference from 21-26 June for those infantry instructors now assigned to the various service schools.

The meeting will stress the fundamentals of infantry training, tactical principles,

organization and logistics. In addition, there will be conferences stressing the new developments and trends, new weapons and equipment and new infantry techniques. The conferees will receive instructional material from the Airborne, Automotive, Weapons, Communication, Ranger and Staff Departments of The Infantry School.

Summer Training

More than 4,200 Infantry ROTC cadets and Army Reservists, both officer and enlisted, are expected to train at TIS this summer.

Schedules for the six-week training cycle for ROTC cadets and the two-week training period for the Reserve units will be prepared in April.

Patterson Award

Second Lieutenant Robert J. Geniesse, who graduated from the Infantry OCS last year, received the second annual Patterson Memorial Award.

This award is given annually to the graduate of the Infantry OCS who "distinguishes himself by demonstrating outstanding qualities of leadership, academic proficiency, aptitude and character, and gives promise of exceptional achievement in the service of the nation."

The award, which honors the late Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, consists of an engraved trophy, a scroll and cash.

1954 Army Pistol Team

TIS was host in February to more than 50 of the Army's best pistol shots. The best of the group were selected to represent the Army in the National Mid-Winter Pistol Matches in Tampa, Fla.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Nonstandard Antennas

Some artillerymen appear not to be familiar with the method of using nonstandard antennas to increase the line-of-sight capability of frequency-modulated radio sets.

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ARTILLERY QUOTATION OF THE MONTH



We have the best artillery in the world.

GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS
Desert Rock, Nev., May 1953

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

The best way to improve the capability is to place the radio set itself in a higher or clearer position and operate it with standard remote control equipment . . . a process which assures maximum efficiency from the field or vehicular antenna as it is still mounted on or at the radio set. The second method of increasing line-of-sight is to improve the location of the antenna while the radio set remains in a protected position. However, achievement of communication by such methods—employing the issue antenna—is sometimes impossible or difficult to the point of impracticability. In those instances, nonstandard antennas may be used.

Diagrams of two different expedient antennas—"the vertical half wave" and "the vehicular" are shown in Figures 1 and 2 below.



The sufficiency of the diagrams themselves makes it feasible to limit discussion of construction to the vertical half wave antenna only; for that expedient—(1) Run out the necessary length of field wire; this length should be an odd multiple of the quarter wave length of the set. At the antenna end, tape back one quarter wave length from the end; the distance is obtained from the formula: "Quarter wave length = $234/\text{frequency (in mcs.)}$." The answer is in feet. Thus, for a frequency of 30.0 mcs, the length would be $234/30$ or 7.8 feet. (2) Separate the wires as shown and suspend one end in the air from a tree or pole; let the other end hang free of the ground. (3) Using a coaxial adapter, connect the radio set end of the lead-in to the appropriate terminal on the radio set. (4) If the antenna fails to give the desired re-

sults, the length of lead-in is varied (by inches) until satisfactory communication is established.

Radio Violations Decrease

The increased emphasis placed on radio communication at TAS (reported in the December 1953 issue) has paid off with a sharp decrease in student procedure violations. A recent 2-week check of problems showed that only five errors are consistently made. Since these errors are not restricted to situations at TAS, they are listed here as a guide for the general improvement of radio communication:

❏ Unauthorized transmissions: These sometimes degenerate into personal conversations. Excessive transmissions cause delay and slow the problem.

❏ Failure to press microphone switch a second or two before starting transmissions. By not allowing the transmitter to warm up, the first few words may be lost.

❏ Unnecessary communication checks.

❏ Operators transmitting before listening: Such action causes break-ins on transmission in progress and disrupts communication.

❏ Speaking too fast when sending fire missions: Rapidity causes unnecessary FDC errors and requires avoidable repetition of transmissions.

Battery Failures

Using units can avoid many instances of battery failure with the AN/PRC-9 by adopting two simple procedures.

First, at the conclusion of each day's operation, the radio operator should mark on the battery itself the amount of time it was in use during the period. And second, when a battery is nearly exhausted, it should be discarded.


This "near exhaustion" stage can be determined accurately by a load-voltage test conducted, preferably, in the following manner: In preparation for the test, the operator should (1) remove the transmitter-receiver unit from its case and plug it into a BA-279/U; (2) install handset H-33/PT; (3) turn the receiver to full volume; and (4) turn on squelch switch—without advance. The actual test is then made with a D-C voltmeter; the test sequence and meaning of readings obtained are shown here:

READING	USABLE	DISCARD
— A to + A	1.2 to 1.35	1.15 or lower
— B to + B1	52 to 60	51 or lower
Press microphone switch and read		
— B to + B2	105 to 120	104 or lower
— C to + C2	4.5 to 5.0	4.5 or lower

In connection with the above, it should be noted that voltages listed on the side of the BA-279/U are for "test before using data" and intended for use only with Battery Tester TS-183/U and new batteries.

Bunker Roof Tested by Fire

A firing test was recently conducted by the Department of Combat Arms, TAS,



to determine what effect U.S. projectiles with quick and delay fuzes have on earth-and-log-bunker roofs (see cut) such as were used in Korea. It was known that this type of roof had withstood the direct hit of a 122mm shell "without even any dust being shaken down on the occupants of the bunker"; however, it was not known whether the projectile had a quick or delay fuze. Since Fort Sill did not have any 122mm howitzers, the test was conducted in two parts: the 105mm howitzer firing fuze delay and the 155mm howitzer firing fuze quick.

TAS Librarian to Retire

Morris Swett, known wherever artillerymen foregather as the Chief Librarian of The Artillery School, is going to retire this year—for the second time. It will mark the end of 39 years of service at the Fort Sill library; service that was continuous except for a few months on the staff of *The Field Artillery Journal* in 1939.

Now 65, Morris Swett enlisted in the Army in 1909 and spent several years at West Point with duty in the Academy's library. In 1915 he was transferred to the School of Fire at Fort Sill and remained until 1939 when he was retired from the Army as a Master Sergeant. He then joined *The Field Artillery Journal*. In October of that year, the late President Roosevelt issued an unprecedented executive order placing Mr. Swett in the civil service and back in his job as librarian at TAS.

During his years as chief librarian at TAS, Mr. Swett directed the library's growth and saw it expand both in size and service until today the TAS library is one of the most complete military libraries in the world.



MORRIS SWETT

The roofs fired on consisted of a layer of logs which were one inch in diameter for each foot of unsupported span, about 5 feet of packed earth with a sandbag rim, and a burster plate. For the various phases of the test, the only difference in the roofs was in the burster plate (a hard layer of material near the surface of the roof designed to insure early activation of the fuze).

In the first part of the test, with the 105, terminal ballistics (striking velocity and angle of impact) were the same as for charge 7 fired at range 7500. One burster plate was constructed of 3-inch slab rock; the other, of earth- or rock-filled metal canisters. In this test, a 105mm projectile with delay fuze blew away a large amount of packed earth; but paper stretched underneath the layer of logs was undamaged.

In the second test, it was determined that charge 4 at 800 yards would approximate the terminal ballistics to be expected from indirect fire with charge 6 at 10,000 yards. Three kinds of burster plate were employed: earth-filled metal canisters, three inches of small rock, and a layer of 3-inch rock slabs.

Results of this part of the test were similar to those obtained with the 105mm howitzer. Externally, great damage was done to the roof; internally, there was none beyond the starting of transverse cracks in several of the older and drier logs and longitudinal cracks in one or two of the relatively sound logs (no logs were cracked by the 105mm projectiles). Because it was considered a certainty that a 155mm shell with delay fuze would penetrate or smash the logs and because the Communists are not likely to use delay fuze in unobserved counterbattery fire, there was no test with the 155mm fuze delay.

As compared with metal canisters and 3-inch small rock, the greater strength of the slab rock burster makes it the most desirable for inclusion in a bunker roof. Metal canisters and 3-inch small rock are virtually equivalent to each other in resistance capacity.

Appropriate modification of the figures given in FM 5-15 has been recommended.

The Month's Books

FROM NORMANDY TO POTSDAM

TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY: The Second World War, Volume VI. By Winston S. Churchill. Houghton Mifflin, 1953. 800 Pages; Maps; Diagrams; \$6.00.

The theme of the final volume in Churchill's monumental "personal" history of World War II is an ironic one. It runs: "How the Great Democracies Triumphed and so Were able to Resume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their Life." The coverage is from D-day to Churchill's defeat at the polls in the midst of the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.

It was in this period that for the first time Sir Winston began to have misunderstandings with Roosevelt and sharp differences of opinion of politico-strategical matters with Eisenhower. It was also during this period that Stalin's imperialism began to assert itself. Churchill could see the Grand Alliance which he had done so much to construct achieving one military victory after another, but at the same time he feared that political advantages of incalculable importance were being lost in the purely "military" strategy adhered to by the American government in western Europe.

Those partisan Americans, who have pretended to find in General Marshall's advocacy of a cross-Channel attack in 1944 an aid to Communist causes, will find no support for their crazy theories in Churchill's pages. He was all for a cross-Channel attack and knew that he could not risk failure in *Overlord* on account of any adventure "in the Balkans." He did not advocate Anglo-American operations in the Balkans but suggested abandoning the invasion of Southern France in 1944 in order to strengthen Alexander's forces in Italy to a point where they could defeat Kesselring decisively and invade Austria via the Istrian peninsula.

In view of Churchill's decisive defeat at the polls in July 1945, it may be pointed out that his proposed operations via the Adriatic could not have prevented the ultimate Communist domination of this area in the postwar period unless the Labor Government which succeeded him was prepared to keep large British military forces in this area for an indefinite period to offset the Red Army. Since the United States was unwilling to do this and had announced our desire to pull our troops out of Europe as rapidly as possible, it was somewhat visionary of Sir Winston to cherish the thought that a change in strategy alone might have stemmed the Red flood which swept over Eastern and Central Europe from 1945-1947.

The first and last requirement of strategy and policy is that it must be effectively implemented. With both Britain and the United States determined to demobilize

their armies, navies and air forces immediately after the German and Japanese defeats, there could be no effective counter to Soviet aggression in the power-vacuum areas created by these developments. These are the hard facts of life and neither the glittering quality of Sir Winston's prose, nor our resentment at his shabby treatment at the polls in 1945 should obscure these realities.

Churchill's instructions to General Scobie, the British officer in charge of operations in Athens in December 1944, may well serve as a model for political leaders when required to give guidance to their military subordinates in similar situations. He told General Scobie just what had to be done but *not how*, and assured him that he would be supported to the full if he were forced to shed Greek blood.

Sir Winston's chapters on Yalta make it clear that there never was a "Yalta Betrayal" in the sense that Roosevelt alone sacrificed interests and rights which he had

the power to secure against Soviet military might. For those who argue that an Allied invasion of Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia would have worked against the long-term interests of the Soviets, it should be pointed out that at Yalta, Stalin actually proposed that the British and Americans do this! But as Churchill observes: "It cost him nothing to say this now."

Where Churchill is likely to look best in history is in his conviction expressed shortly after VE-day that Britain and America should attempt to win a final settlement on outstanding differences with the Soviet Union *while they yet possessed great military power in Europe*. In an urgent message to Mr. Truman on May 12, 1945, Churchill wrote: "What will be the position in a year or two when the British and American Armies have melted and the French has not yet been forced on any major scale, when we have a handful of divisions, mostly French, and when Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active service? Surely it is vital now to come to an understanding with Russia, or see where we are with her, before we weaken our armies mortally. . . ."

The meeting he proposed came at Potsdam and in the midst of it, he was relieved of his office by the British voters.

The Churchill program of maintaining military strength in Europe after the war would have to be complemented by a firmly-adhered-to policy of employing this strength in diplomatic actions to force her back to the boundaries of 1939. As we discovered in the Acheson period, "building up situations of strength" as a basis for negotiation with the Soviet Union, is not enough. The time comes when a nation must be prepared to act on the basis of that strength, otherwise nothing happens.

Shortly before the appearance of this volume, Churchill received the Nobel Prize for literature. This volume itself may not rank among his most notable literary works. It was composed in the midst of exacting political requirements and is filled with quotations from contemporary documents. The publication of these papers, however, makes the volume of outstanding importance to the student of world affairs and to military readers. Taken together the six volumes of this tremendous series constitute the most important single contribution to the history of our troubled times. They belong in the library of every serious student of war.—H. A. DeWEERD

DAUGHTER OF THE FLOOD

UNCONDITIONAL HATRED: German War Guilt and the Future of Europe. By Captain Russell Grenfell, R.N. The Devin-Adair Company, 1953. 273 Pages; Index; \$3.75.

American readers acquainted with the writings of Captain Grenfell are aware that

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My idea was that every recruit should have the full infantry training before he was put in the artillery, the engineers or the armored units for supporting front-line duty or to supply or desk jobs in the rear areas. Every soldier, I firmly believed, should be taught to fight on the ground, with his rifle, before he was assigned to specialized branches. Then when he had to, as many men have, he could fight like an infantryman and protect himself and his fellows like a doughboy.

Along with this training I wanted to make the rifle the symbol, the personal symbol, of each infantryman. Each rifle is individual and has its own characteristics which a man must learn. I wanted to institute a system in which each soldier would have a single rifle throughout his tour of duty, a rifle that would be given to him with ceremony, preferably by his general, when he earned the right to carry it.

GENERAL MARK W. CLARK


From the Danube to the Yalu

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
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


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First Selection

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the good Captain has been steering a somewhat erratic course of late. Though his writings on naval affairs have never featured criticism of his own professional colleagues, even where their backwardness invited it, he has recently set himself up as a critic in the field of world politics and grand strategy. This tendency, already apparent in his *Main Fleet to Singapore* (1951), is carried to unhappy lengths in the book under review.

Reduced to its simplest terms Captain Grenfell's principal theme is that Germany has not been the dangerous aggressor she has been described to be in two world wars. The secondary theme is that Germany posed no real threat to Britain or to the United States in these two wars and it was a mistake to have insisted on the destruction of German military strength in both of these wars.

American isolationists will take comfort from Captain Grenfell's advice that the United States should take its marbles and go home, leaving European security safe in the hands of a new third force, composed of Germany, France, and Britain. The implication that this combination could now, or in the near future, stand against the Soviet Union without American help betrays the extent of the author's confusion.

The blurb on the jacket conveys the impression that this book had to be published in the "still largely uncensored United States." Let no reader assume that British publishers have all suddenly gone conservative—or that they are stupid. They are not stupid. They simply will not publish a bad book merely because the author happened to write a good one in the past.—H. A. DeWEERD.

GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

THE INCOMPATIBLE ALLIES: German-Soviet Relations, 1918-1941. By Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer. The Macmillan Company, 1953. 350 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00.

Gustav Hilger, a German born in Moscow, was Second Counselor at the German embassy in Russia from the time of the revolution in 1917 until the Nazi attack on Russia in June 1941. In the present work he has collaborated with Alfred G. Meyer of the University of Washington.

Hilger had a personal acquaintance with nearly all the important figures in the Russian foreign office, and was a friend and aide to Ambassadors Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dirksen and Count von der Schulenberg.

Students of military affairs will be particularly grateful for the full treatment given to Soviet-German military collaboration from 1919-1930.

Hilger believes that Germany today has two choices: make an alliance with the Western Powers or with the Soviet Union. He warns that the second choice will reduce Germany to the role of a satellite state and make the defense of the rest of Western Europe impossible.—H. A. DeWEERD.

THE MYTH OF THE NON-POLITICAL OFFICER

THE NEMESIS OF POWER: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. By John W. Wheeler-Bennett. St. Martin's Press, 1953. 829 Pages; \$12.00.

Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, a British expert on German affairs, has written what undoubtedly will be a definitive work on the political activities of the German General Staff in recent times. Sound scholarship, penetrating judgment and literary skill are demonstrated in every chapter of this monumental work. The appearance of the book at the eve of rearmament in West Germany is timely. The author acknowledges that the threatening posture of the Soviet Union has made the rearmament of West Germany inevitable, but he wants us to enter the new era with our eyes open to the lessons of past experience.

Mirabeau once observed that Prussia is not a country with an army but an army with a country. War has been Prussia's national industry and no other country showed a more "phenomenal capacity for military resilience or for beating plowshares into swords." Three times in the last 150 years Prussia or Germany has been defeated in war. Twice she made a speedy military recovery led by the same officer corps which presided over the defeat and then deftly passed the responsibility for loss of the war on to the civilian government. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett fears that we have all the makings of a new recovery of power by the German military including a new stab-in-the-back legend. This time it is being claimed that Hitler's interference with the General Staff led to Germany's ultimate defeat in World War II.

Contrary to the commonly-held belief that German officers did not concern themselves with political matters, the author shows that the Army, through the General Staff, exerted a paramount influence on the Government of the Weimar Republic at every stage of its life. It achieved this influence and fostered this legend by operating from outside the government itself. Only during the period of Schleicher did the Army attempt direct control and then with bad results. Aside from a few moments of greatness, the record compiled by the General Staff during the period covered by this volume was one of narrow professionalism, selfishness, moral cowardice, and political ineptitude.

The greatest part of Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's work is devoted to the role of the Reichswehr in the rise of the Nazi Party and finally to the relations between the Army and Hitler. It was part of the Fuehrer's evil genius that he appealed to their basest instincts and brought out the worst that was in men and institutions. Thus, when the Army insisted that Hitler put the S.A. in its place in 1934, Himmler made the Army a party to the massacre of the S.A. The Army did not shoot the S.A. leaders; that was done by the S.S. But the Army condoned this act of barbarism as it also condoned by inaction the murder of

Schleicher and the destruction of Fritsch's reputation. After this, the Army could hardly pretend to be shocked by the concentration camp horrors inside the Reich and the mass extermination organized by the S.S. and Gestapo outside the country.

The German Army sold its soul to the Nazis in 1934 and never could quite make up its mind to recover it. One gets the impression from these pages that as long as Hitler was expanding the Wehrmacht and thus creating new jobs and opportunities for promotion, as long as he was passing out decorations, cash and real estate, and as long as he seemed to be winning the war, the men of the General Staff did not oppose his barbarism. Only a handful of officers around Beck and Hammerstein had the moral soundness and political good sense to oppose Hitler all the time because he represented an evil regime. Late comers to the resistance movement like Rommel and Speidel did not oppose Hitler until his military inefficiency was as apparent as his barbarism had been.

What strikes a foreign reader most strangely about the record of the German officer corps in this period was the weakness and vacillation of the group. There were, of course, admirable exceptions, but in general a record more replete with delays, uncertainties, waverings, and hesitations would be hard to compile. By contrast the non-military participants in the resistance movement were models of firmness and clarity of thought. At one time or another nearly every important German general came out in some kind of opposition to Hitler. This includes Guderian, who pretended to follow a path of unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer to the point of condemning his own colleagues to death but who, at the same time, talked of making an end to the war behind Hitler's back. Despite this almost universal conviction that Hitler had to go, it was never possible for the officer corps to do anything effective about it. Somebody in a key spot was always changing his mind. No one wanted to take the personal responsibility for killing the Fuehrer when that act would have been comparatively easy to carry out. Hundreds of them lost their lives in a muddled and complicated plot which backfired on the officer corps in July 1944.

The German officer corps talked grandly of its "honor." Perhaps Admiral Raeder illustrated its concept of honor more naively than anyone else. He supported Hitler until the end even though he was kicked out of office in 1943. He made no protest against the concentration camps and the extermination of millions of Jews. It was only in March 1945 when his old friend and colleague, Otto Gessler, showed him the scars and mutilations inflicted upon him at the Fürstenberg Concentration Camp at Hitler's orders that the Admiral's sense of "honor" reacted. Then he *secretly* took off the Golden Party Badge that he had worn until that time!

Wheeler-Bennett's chapters on the Ger-

man resistance movement, on the plot of July 20, 1944 and its consequences, are complete and well balanced. He refutes the claim, made in some circles, that a public relaxation of the unconditional surrender demand would have made the task of the groups opposing Hitler any easier. He warns against assuming that Hitler's death in July 1944 would have meant the end of hostilities with the West and a concentration against the Soviet Union. That was Rommel's rather absurd belief. He reminds us that the Allied governments entered and maintained the war at great cost for the primary purpose of destroying German militarism. To have expected any responsible Allied government to preserve remnants of that military strength by a trick truce with a new set of faces in 1944 was to expect the impossible.

Baron vom Stein saw his fellow Russians in the early Nineteenth Century without illusions. He said: "We shall have to wait for an awakening in our country of that public spirit which the British and French and other peoples possess, if we do not imitate them in setting for our military leaders certain bonds and limitations which they must not disregard." These words may be useful to the German people now and in the years to come. This book is indispensable for an understanding of recent German history and that of World War II as well.—H. A. DEWEERD.

RARE BOOK ON RUSSIA

RUSSIAN ASSIGNMENT. By Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens. Little, Brown and Company. 568 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.75.

Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens was Naval Attaché at the American Embassy in Moscow from 1947 to 1949. During those years and in spite of Soviet restrictions on travel and hampered as he was by the reluctance of Russians to talk to foreigners, he learned a great deal about Russia and its people. Admiral Stevens shows himself to be a detached and objective observer who worked hard to understand the Russians and their culture. His unusual knowledge of the Russian language, literature, theater and of Russian art in all its forms enabled him to practice as a social psychologist seeking to understand the relationship of individuals to each other and between the individual and the group. The result is a travel book of rare interest.

There is little reference in this book to the Soviet armed forces or to political and economic affairs. The Russian government comes in for only brief comments, although one never escapes from the sense of fear and repression that despotic communism causes in the Russian people. Many pages are devoted to the theater, ballet, opera, literature and art in Russia, but these are balanced by equally detailed and thoroughly exciting reports on hunting and fishing expeditions, often under extraordinary difficulties and hardship in the harsh Russian climate.

He has been most successful in achiev-

ing his purpose. He finds Russia a "world of spies and informers which substitutes for the Promised Land," but the Russian people appear as sensitive and generous and inclined to be friendly. This is an exceptionally well written and readable interpretation of the mind and heart of the Russian people and of their social system that we in this country will do well to understand.—D.A.

REPORT ON THE AEC

REPORT ON THE ATOM. By Gordon Dean. Alfred A. Knopf, 1953. 328 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

The former chairman of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission gives a sweeping view of the AEC program and its implications from background to forecasts, from relations with the military establishment to appraising Russian achievements and probable intentions.

In the military field Mr. Dean soundly argues that we can "use our tactical weapons in the field" to "virtually cancel out Russian manpower superiority" yet abstain from strategic bombing except in retaliation for Russian attacks on civil populations. He believes the Russians "would certainly think twice" before they invited such retaliation.

Even if, as is probable, Russia also possesses tactical atomic weapons, Mr. Dean remains optimistic because "we have succeeded in getting the competition back on a basis where the premium is no longer on manpower" but "on technological competence and production capacity," our best field.

Any "moral stigma" against using atomic weapons on the battlefield is falsely inspired for selfish reasons. Compared to napalm, atomic weapons are simply bigger, no more horrible.

The author warns that the H-bomb, "rigged" to produce high radioactivity over "thousands of miles in the direction of prevailing winds," can become "an instrument for the destruction of civilization and possibly of all mankind." His only ray of hope lies in the user's fear of "boomerang effect from air currents" the user "could not predict . . . in advance." Here the unscientific reader is at a loss to argue but recollections of high altitude weather prediction leave him uneasy.

In the military field, the book contains contradictions. Atomic weapons are called "absolute whether the target is a regiment or a whole nation" then, two pages later, "good civil defense" can reduce casualties "perhaps 50 per cent" and "reduce property damage."

Arguing reasonably for adequate production, he contends less soundly that mere stockpiles will "deter attack on our homeland" and "help deter" fringe wars like Korea. Unmentioned are the delivery agencies, capable of penetrating hostile defenses, to place those stockpiled bombs on the selected targets.

However, Mr. Dean returns to full agreement with strategic doctrine when he

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forecasts a short decisive atomic war since "conversion of assembly lines to items of war while atomic bombs rain about them is utterly unrealistic."

His principles governing the division of authority between military and civil power are incontrovertible but a misconception appears regarding procedures. He states that it is the business of the military to "recommend the number of weapons to adequately defend the U.S." "This recommendation is not a requirement . . . which cannot be questioned . . . by the civil power."

What of the directive (clear statement of national policy) which the military must have *before* it can make a sensible recommendation? Weapons to defend Korea against invasion were not likely to be included in the military's 1950 recommendations when it had been officially stated that "Korea was of no strategic importance to the U.S."

Thus the demand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "originate recommendations for military planning and operations" which "the National Security Council reviews" omits the essential first step. The JCS recommendations must be based upon National Security Council directives on national policy, because of the very preeminence of the civil power Mr. Dean supports.

Like Dr. Vannevar Bush he urges closer liaison between science, represented by the commission, and the JCS; liaison which he says is presently lacking.

Mr. Dean also convicts this country of "consistently underrating Russian technological and production achievement." Instead we "should believe what we see." A chapter packed with comparative statistics supports his argument.

On the future of peaceful developments in atomic energy Mr. Dean is both optimistic and conservative.—COL. GEORGE C. REINHARDT

MEXICAN WAR GENERAL

GENERAL WILLIAM JENKINS WORTH: *Monterrey's Forgotten Hero.* By Edward S. Wallace. Southern Methodist University Press. 242 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00.

It is natural but unfortunate that the Mexican War has been overshadowed by the longer, bloodier and more significant War Between the States which came such a short time later. The fact is, the campaigns of the Mexican War stand as the first consistently well conducted operations of the United States Army. True, there were brilliant achievements by Captains Lee and Bragg, Lieutenants Grant and Thomas and Jackson, but the major credit should go to the senior commanders who were responsible for the planning and execution of an unbroken succession of victories against invariably superior numbers of Mexican troops. Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor have received a good deal of attention (although not as much as they deserve); however, the subordinate generals such as

Quitman, Twiggs, and Worth are virtually unknown.

On that ground alone, Edward Wallace's biography of General Worth would be a valuable addition to American military literature. In addition, though, he has produced a book which is not only sound but extremely readable. Devoting the first third of his work to Worth's early career, in the remainder Wallace presents a clear and interesting account of Worth's participation in the campaigns in northern Mexico and then in Scott's expedition from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.

It is regrettable that Wallace makes frequent comparisons between Worth and the late General Patton, basing them on what can only be described as gross oversimplifications of the circumstances. But this is a minor defect, and the merit of the book as a whole is so great as to make this flaw hardly worth mentioning.

The text has been illustrated with excellent maps and a fine selection of contemporaneous prints and engravings which are of considerable interest in themselves.

—LT. COL. JOHN B. B. TRUSSELL, JR.

ADMIRAL TURNED NOVELIST

THE JUNGLE SEAS. By Rear Admiral Arthur A. Agaton, U. S. Navy (Ret.). Random House, 1954. 339 Pages; \$3.75.

Admiral Agaton, Naval Academy graduate, destroyer skipper, Invasion Force Commander and developer of a simplified system of solving for lines of position in navigation, is a man peculiarly well qualified for a second career of writing about the Navy. Members of the Naval Service have long appreciated those few books written about it by persons who have gone the long way in it. Which is not to say that there have not been excellent books about the Navy from the pens of others, but only that the technical training for a military life at sea is not conducive, in general, to a literary bent. This reviewer was consequently delighted with the opportunity to read *The Jungle Seas*.

The book deals with the South Pacific campaign in the early days of World War II, when our troops were struggling for a toehold on Guadalcanal—and the Tokyo Express, running nightly down The Slot, was doing its best to cut them off. It deals also with life in Noumea, the French base from which some of our forces operated, and concerns the hectic pulsating life ashore: The men off their ships and the women receiving them.

The hero of the story is Lieutenant Jerry Doyle, Executive Officer of U.S.S. *Hale* (DD-456). On the flyleaf of the jacket, Doyle is described as a man who looked at women in such a way as "to bring them to him in droves." For the record, it should be pointed out that Jerry Doyle seemed to know his stuff as "Exec" and later as skipper of a destroyer.

The Jungle Seas deals primarily with men and women enmeshed in the problems resulting from the war. The locale, partly

aboard a United States destroyer in combat and partly ashore in Noumea, provides the frame against which the story of men and women in love and battle is portrayed. Agaton writes cleverly with deep familiarity with naval subjects. His descriptions of destroyer life and the actions and reactions of destroyer personnel well from the deep backgrounds of his own years of service experience. This reviewer, perhaps because of his own professional affiliation, would, however, like to have seen a bit more explanation of the destroyer actions—a minor criticism to which all books fall heir in one form or another.

The big story behind the book—the deathless story—that can never be forgotten is about the fearless men and doughty ships and the fierce running sea battles in the jungle seas off Guadalcanal. A century ago fleet actions smaller than these would have been cause for reams of vocal and literary adulation. In later days they have been neglected for more glamorous things, and, to be sure, they have lacked a spokesman. In the telling of this long awaited saga, as brave and daring as any known to history, Admiral Agaton has given a good account of himself. It is hoped the future will realize the hint of more to come from the same author.—COMMANDER EDWARD L. BEACH, U.S.N.

DANGER! PRETTY CHARTS AHEAD!

HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS. By Darrell Huff. Illustrated by Irving Teis. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 142 Pages; \$2.95.

Why the publishers chose to hide a valuable book from public gaze by using a "cute" title is beyond me. A much better title, more truthful and one that might have sold the book to the millions who need it would have been: *How to Read Statistics and Graphs Intelligently*.

The statistician who wants to prove a point can do so without resorting to anything as crude as an outright lie. All he has to do to be convincing is to use a mean when a median would show a truer picture, or emphasize the percentile when the reader thinks he means a percentage, or use a figure in a pictograph which is twice as high but gives the impression of eight times the bulk, or make a percentage of increase look like a percentage of the whole, or distort an abscissa or an ordinate—there are dozens of other tricks.

In these busy days when most of us get a large part of our information from graphs and pictographs, it is a good idea to be able to find the jokers in the presentations. The next time the motor officer tells you that he has cut his accident rate in half, find out whether it is the rate per vehicle, per vehicle mile, per vehicle hour, whether he has changed his base lately, and just what he calls an accident. There are many, many ways we can be fooled by statistical sharpies, and when we are fooled it can be costly.

An hour or two spent with this book will make a healthy skeptic out of the most gullible; and since the military must deal

with facts we should be sure our facts are correct, and not what some graph artist wants us to believe are correct.—A.S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

THE GREAT IRON SHIP. By James Dugan. Harper & Brothers, 1953. 272 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50. The story of the ship that laid the Atlantic cable. The *Great Eastern* was the largest iron ship ever built.

THE COMPLETE AND AUTHENTIC LIFE OF JESSE JAMES. By Carl W. Brehnan. Frederick Fell, 1953. 287 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.50. Together with all known and verified data about Jesse, his brother Frank, and the Younger brothers.

THE SECOND TREE FROM THE CORNER. By E. B. White. Harper & Brothers, 1953. 253 Pages; \$3.00. The author's selection of his own pieces (of whatever nature) written over the past twenty years, that he thinks stand the test of time.

THE OFFICERS GUIDE. Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. 569 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00. Twentieth edition of a ready reference on customs and correct procedures which pertain to commissioned officers of the Army.

THE ARMY WIFE. By Nancy Shea. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 367 Pages; Index; \$3.50. Third revised edition. Advice for wives of officers, NCOs, and other ranks.

THE AMERICAN LEGION READER. Fiction, Articles, Humor, Cartoons from *The American Legion Magazine*, Selected by Victor Lasky. Hawthorn Books, 1954. 500 Pages; \$4.95.

THESE MEN MY FRIENDS. By George Stewart. The Caxton Printers, 1954. 400 Pages; \$6.00. A narrative of men and events in the British Army and the RAF during ten extended tours in the UK, Africa, Asia, and Europe.

THE AMERICAN EVERYDAY DICTIONARY. Edited by Jess Stein. Random House, 1954. 570 Pages; Illustrated; Thumb-indexed; \$2.50. All the everyday words and meanings, with the less common words that the average person might occasionally use.

A NEW PATTERN FOR A TIRED WORLD. By Louis Bromfield. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 314 Pages; \$3.75. Most of the present troubles in the world arise, in Bromfield's opinion, from serious maladjustments and limitations of raw materials, markets, food and population.

HOW TO RESTORE ANTIQUE AND CLASSIC CARS. Edited by George A. Uskali and Curt L. Johnson. Popular Mechanics Press, 1954. 190 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.95. Rebuilding old engines, restoration of bodies, leather upholstery, springs, tires and tubes, and painting.

APRIL 1954



Pass In Review

Lee Nichols, a United Press reporter, has put together an excellent documentary on the evolution of racial integration in our Armed Forces in a new book called *Breakthrough On The Color Front* (\$3.50). Despite that unfortunate title (which sounds like a new wrinkle in television), Nichols' book is a valuable record of a major social reform that has been accomplished in a remarkably short period of time and almost without incident. There is little new or startling in the book for most uninformed readers who have been a party to the events which he describes, but it is a highly interesting report of a solid American achievement that has, among other things, knocked a big hole in Communist propaganda precedures.

This has been a good year for books about wartime escapes. Since we mentioned this subject last month, we've read another book that falls in that category although, technically speaking, it's more about what transpired before the escape took place. It is *Eight Bailed Out* (\$3.00) and is written by a Major James Inks, USAF. Inks was a member of a B-24 crew that got shot down on a Ploesti raid and then spent several months with Czech guerrillas of both breeds before being returned to Allied control. It's quite a story.

A brief word to a number of disappointed book customers: additional copies of Possony's *Strategic Air Power* (Combat Forces Press; \$5.00) have now been bound and it is back in stock.

If you are one of our regular book customers, with your name in our files, you are being cut in on a good thing. As a result of our annual inventory, we have decided to eliminate a number of titles from our stocks. To dispose of them, we have made up a folder listing all of the titles and offering them to you at low prices. These were mailed out to those book customers whose names we have. If your name wasn't on our list and you'd like to get in on this sale, let's hear from you.

In the interests of self-preservation, I prefer not to discuss books that I haven't dipped into myself. This month, however, I feel that circumstances warrant a departure from that practice. The editor of this magazine has been stopping by my desk from time to time, regaling me with passages from Isaac Deutscher's new book about Trotsky called *The Prophet Armed* (\$6.00). He's made me think it is a book I must read and I hereby pass his recommendation on to you.

Discussing books in a military magazine is somewhat confining in that most of the titles necessarily deal with the grim business of warfare or at least are serious. However, I should like to mention one this month solely for the reason that it is sheer pleasure to read. This is *Coorina* (\$2.75) by Erle Wilson. It is a story about the Marsupial Wolf, indigenous to Australia, and a more beautifully told story hasn't come to my attention in a long while. The book has no message, no axe to grind, and may not even be factually correct, although it appears to be. Pleasurable reading, though.

Among the upcoming books of interest are: *From the Danube to the Yalu* (\$5.00) by General Mark Clark, due in May; *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur* (\$5.00) by Frazier Hunt, due in June; and two titles just out, *Churchill By His Contemporaries* (\$6.00) edited by Charles Eade; and *Secretary Stimson* (\$4.50) by Richard N. Current.

Worthy of separate mention is *U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition* (\$3.00) which will be out this month. Written by Bruce Catton, whose *Stillness at Appomattox* (\$5.00) won this year's National Book Award, this new book is a short biography and an all-around appraisal of the life and career of U. S. Grant.

Parents will find Dr. Fredric Wertham's *Seduction of the Innocent* (\$4.00) of great interest. Dr. Wertham attacks comic books, citing them as being an invitation to illiteracy, a stimulus to unwholesome fantasies, suggestive of criminal and sexually perverted ideas and actions and as helping to tip the scales toward maladjustment and delinquency.

—R.F.C.

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An 81mm mortar position in the densely-wooded hill country northwest of Hanoi. The mortarmen are members of the French Foreign Legion.



In an approach to a Vitminh guerrilla base a French paratrooper with a rifle grenade in place on his 7.5mm MAS rifle moves through the grass that covers the lowlands southwest of Hanoi.

The Month's Pictures

Indochina Terrain Makes It an Infantry War

A French infantry outfit uses an amphibian vehicle to cross a swollen stream in the Red River Delta southeast of Hanoi.

